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Title: The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the increasing demand for sustainability. How, 
and if so, why, have these events influenced Swedish listed large-cap firms´ voluntary 
disclosure, as well as their usage of measurements and goals during the years 2007 – 2015?  
Background and problematization: Åkesson (2008) studied the non-regulated part of the 
annual report in 16 large-cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm during the years 1965-
2004, in order to describe and explain, in general, the development of financial – and non-
financial measurements and goals. We partially continued this study, by examining mostly the 
same firms, but during the time-period 2007-2015, and instead of focusing on all possible 
explanations for the development of financial – and non-financial measurement and goals, we 
chose to partially study the adoption of IFRS, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
increased demand for sustainability´s possible influence on the measurements and goals.  
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe, and compare, which financial – and non-
financial goals and measurements that large-cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm 
presented during the period of 2007-2015. After that has been done, we are going to try to 
explain and identify, in general, how, and why, the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the 
increasing demand for sustainability has influenced/affected the development of the non-
regulated part of the annual report, in the aforementioned category of companies. How, and if, 
the adoption of IFRS has had an impact on the volume of voluntary disclosure, will also be 
examined.  
Delimitations: We only examined large-cap Swedish companies that have been listed during 
the years 2007-2015, more specific, we tried to use the firms that Åkesson (2008) used in this 
Licentiate paper “Financial measurements and goals in public Swedish firms 1965 – 2004”. 
We focused exclusively on how the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the phenomenon 
sustainability have influenced the design of the voluntary disclosure in Swedish large-cap 
firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm, and how, and if, the adoption of IFRS has had an 
impact on the volume of voluntary disclosure.    
Method: We used two different analysis designs in this study. The first one is a data-based 
approach which focuses on a specific section of financial data, which in our case consist of 
data extracted from the non-regulatory part of the annual reports. In order to give a 
complementing description of the data-based approach, and to explain it, a text-based part was 
included in the study. This data consists of management commentaries obtained from the non-
regulated part of the annual reports, as well as an interview with one of the examined firms 
former CFO.  
  
Results and conclusions: The financial crisis of 2007-2008 seems to have had a large impact 
in the usage of measurements, as well as the volume of voluntary disclosure at large. The 
reason for this seems to be connected to the firms’ strife of staying/becoming legitimized. The 
increasing demand for sustainability seems to have had a large impact on the way firms act 
and report. It is hard to argue that this behavior can be explained by information asymmetry 
theory, on the contrary, being seen as legitimate relative your competitors, seems as the more 
likely explanation. The adoption of IFRS seems to had no, and in some cases even a negative 
impact on the non-regulatory volume. 
The various measurement popularity in 2007 compared to 2015 has changed for all different 
categories of measurements. Measurements of return, employee, investments and value based 
have decreased in popularity, while measurements like stock, capital structure, unprocessed, 
and sustainability have increased in popularity. Margin measurements popularity did not 
change during the examined years.  
Suggestions for future research: One part of the studies purpose was to describe how the 
occurrence and the number of financial- and non-financial goals and measurements changed 
over time in Swedish public companies` financial reports. We wondered why these changes, 
in both individual measurements and in the categorized measurements, occurred. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to try to explain the changes in popularity of these measurements in 
depth, instead of generally like we did in this paper.   
Another interesting research area would be to examine all measurements and goals that firms 
in Sweden have presented during the years 1965 to 2015. Then you would be able to describe 
the development of measurements and goals over time, and see when new measurements and 
goals are introduced.  
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In this chapter, we will first and foremost introduce causes to why the subject is relevant and 
interesting, as well as the purpose of the study. The chapter is then concluded with a 
description of the delimitations as well as a disposition of the study.    
 1.1 Background 
The initial event that sparked our interest for annual reports may be located back to when we 
started buying stocks, which was in upper secondary school. Even though we did not read and 
analyze the annual reports as critically and thoroughly as we do today, we still found the fact 
that firms choose to present and focus on different measurements and goals over time, very 
interesting. 
This fascination has increased severely the last couple of months, mainly because the recent 
courses has focused on this area. After some case studies was done, and Åkesson presented us 
with the opportunity to continue his study about public Swedish firms’ goals and 
measurements, the choice of thesis subject was obvious.  
Åkesson`s (2008) study involved Swedish firms that have been publicly listed at least from 
1965 until 2004. The purpose of his paper was to describe and explain the appearance and 
development of financial measurements and goals, in the non-regulated part of the annual 
reports. He chose the non-regulated part since this section exclusively contains information 
that firms choose to disclose.  
The study concluded that the voluntary disclosure, as well as the presentation of financial 
measurements and goals had increased during the examined time-period. This development 
could be separated into two time-periods, 1965 – 1990 and 1990 – 2004. The development in 
the first period could mainly be explained by the huge influence that professor Sven-Erik 
Johansson and his research team had, the heavily limited liberty that larger firms in Sweden 
had in the capital market, and the social and political pressure regarding firms profit. Put 
differently, institutional pressure and heavy regulations may explain this development.  
During the second time-period, regulations regarding the capital market was not as strict as 
before, therefore enabling the firms to obtain funds from foreign investors. This lead to firms 
becoming more influenced by international regulations and praxis’s, which made the firms 
more internationalized in their reporting. The increase of professional investors may also be a 
contributing factor to this development, since these investors wanted information regarding 
the firms’ efforts of creating value for their shareholders. In other words, internationalization 
and new shareholder demand may be explanatory factors for the development that occurred 
during this second time-period. 
 1.2 Problematization 
After some research, we concluded that events, that may have influenced firms non-regulatory 
reporting, was; the introduction and new legislation regarding the regulated part of the annual 
report, i.e. IFRS, the financial crisis that took place in 2007 and 2008, and the increased 
demand for sustainability.  





All firms that are listed on NASDAQ Stockholm must, after 2005, follow the regulations and 
recommendations that are stated in the IFRS. Even though these only regard the regulated part 
of the annual report, studies, like the one made by Broberg, Tagesson & Collin (2010) claims 
that the voluntary disclosure has increased after the adoption of IFRS. Since we did not 
examine comparability or transparency in this thesis, we chose to only partially examine if the 
adoption of IFRS has possibly influenced the volume of voluntary disclosure.  
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 may have affected the formulation of the voluntary 
disclosure. In times of turbulence, the financial risk tends to increase, due to market 
uncertainty (Manela & Moreira, 2017). Some studies claim that in times like this, a demand 
for more information, from the shareholders, is created (Đurić, Knežević & Rakočević, 2011; 
Haji & Ghazali, 2011). This is why we chose to examine how, and if so, why the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 has possibly influenced the non-regulated part of the annual report.  
Since Sweden in December of 2016 adopted a sustainability reporting act, sustainability could 
be looked at as a very important subject from a Swedish perspective. Studies also claim that 
shareholders value firms that act sustainable, and report about it (Friedman & Miles, 2001; El 
Goul et al., 2011), and that Swedish firms increased their sustainability reporting substantially 
from 1998 – 2008 (Erlandsson & Oliander, 2009) as well as in 2006 – 2010 (Ernfjord & 
Gustafsson, 2015). Therefore, we chose to examine if, and how, the increasing demand for 
sustainability has influenced firms voluntary reporting.  
 1.3 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to describe, and compare, which financial – and non-financial 
goals and measurements that large-cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm presented during 
the period of 2007-2015. After that has been done, we are going to try to explain and identify, 
in general, how, and why, the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the increasing demand for 
sustainability has influenced/affected the development of the non-regulated part of the annual 
report, in the aforementioned category of companies. How, and if, the adoption of IFRS has 
had an impact on the volume of voluntary disclosure, will also be examined.  
 1.4 Delimitations 
We only examined large-cap Swedish companies that have been listed during the years 2005-
2015, more specific, we tried to use the firms that Åkesson (2008) used in this Licentiate 
paper “Financial measurements and goals in public Swedish firms 1965 – 2004”. 
We focused exclusively on how the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the increasing demand 
for sustainability have influenced the design of the voluntary disclosure in Swedish large-cap 
firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm, and how, and if, the adoption of IFRS has had an 









 1.5 Disposition 
Chapter 2 included a theoretical framework, with the purpose of 
explaining the necessary theory that is needed, as well as creating 
a link between the theoretical framework and the subject area. It 
was concluded by an introduction, as well as an explanation, of the 
analysis methods that were used in chapter four of this paper.  
  
In chapter 3, the research’s papers selections and an explanation of 
different elements and instruments to further strengthen the study´s 
credibility were presented and motivated. 
 
 
In chapter 4, the empirical evidence that has been obtained from 
the annual reports was introduced, as well as an analysis of it  
 
In chapter 5, the conclusions that were made in the previous 
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2 Theoretical framework 
Here will scientifically relevant articles be presented for the reader, where the goal is 
twofold. Firstly, to cover theoretical and regulatory related ignorance, followed by a 
connection between the theoretical framework and the subject area. The process of retrieving 
these articles will be described in the method chapter. 
 2.1 Formal regulation of annual reports 
In order to understand how firms, formulate their non-regulated part of the annual report, we 
need to know what is in the regulated part. Therefore, we have chosen to present, in a 
thorough way, what companies have to present in the annual report. In this paper, we refer to 
both IFRS and IAS when using the term IFRS.  
The annual report is regulated by the bookkeeping act (BFL) (1999:1078) and the annual 
accounts act (ÅRL) (1995:1554). BFL gives indicative and guiding regulations how to 
correctly account information, for companies in Sweden. BFL (1999:1078) also regulates 
which types of companies that are obligated to create an annual report. 
 
In July 2002, the European parliament and the council passed new regulations concerning 
international accounting standards, which meant that companies had to follow both 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). (Finansinspektionen, 2006). But it was not until the first of January 2005, that 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was introduced in Sweden. Listed 
companies include companies that are active in specific financial markets. In Sweden are 
those markets Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Ab and Nordic Growth Market NGM AB.  
 
Companies on these lists have to follow the IFRS standards. SOU 2003:71 states that: 
“the purpose of the regulation is that it, through its demands for uniform 
accounting principles within the EU, will help to create an efficient, cost 
effective and functioning capital market. The EU Regulation reinforces the 
freedom of movement of capital in the internal market and create conditions 
for companies in the communion to compete on an equal terms for financial 
resources available on the communion capital market, as well as in the 
global markets.” 
The introduction of IFRS in Sweden led to changes in ÅRL (1995:1554), introduced new 
requirements on how to report and leave notes in the annual reports and presented new 
regulations on already existing information. All of these changes made it mandatory for 
companies to include new and more specific information in the annual reports, especially 
information regarding corporate groups, financial instrument and the valuation of them, 
valuation of intangible and tangible assets, depreciation of intangible assets, and goodwill. 
(SOU 2003:71; ÅRL 1995:1554; SFS 2004:1173; Finansinspektionen 2006).  
As earlier stated, these changes were made mainly to further harmonize how companies in EU 
provide information to stakeholders and thereby increase the comparability between different 
markets within the EU (EG nr 1606/2002). 





Lang & Stice-Lawrence (2015) concluded that companies that adopted IFRS provided longer 
annual reports, and that the companies with the greatest increases in quantity disclosed, due to 
implementation of IFRS, benefited more compared to companies who did not increase their 
disclosure. Broberg, Tagesson and Collin (2010) concluded that companies active on 
Stockholm stock exchange disclosed more voluntary information, especially share-related 
information, after the mandatory introduction of IFRS.    
 
ÅRL (1995:1554) states that the annual report has to include four parts. A balance sheet, a 
result sheet, notes and a management report. The balance sheet, have to contain the company's 
assets, equity and liabilities, whereas the results sheet should cover all incomes and costs.  
The third requirement is corporate disclosure, which is presented in the form of notes. These 
notes must show calculations and further explain the outcomes in the balance and result 
sheets. The last required part of the corporate disclosure is a management report. This report 
gives an overview of the company as well as additional information that is not described in 
the prior parts. 
 
They must also present information that is related to the company’s position on the market, 
occurrences during the year that has had essential importance to the company, the expected 
development in the future, R&D and branches overseas (6 chapter. 1 § ÅRL) 
“A complete financial report must contain; a report of the financial situation, a report of the 
total return, a review of the changes in equity, cash flow analysis and notes.”. 
Banks and securities companies is further regulated by (1995:1559). This law regulates 
specifically banks and financial companies trading in securities. 2 chapter. 1 § states that 
banks and securities companies is required to include a capital adequacy additionally to the 
regulations in ÅRL.  
 
Specific complementary rules apply for credit institutions, securities companies (1995:1559) 
and insurance companies (1995:1560), they have to also include the parts regulated by IAS 1 
pt. 10 (International accounting standards).  
 
IAS 1 demands that firms include, in their annual report, the following: 
(a)a statement of financial position as at the end of the period;  
(b) a statement of comprehensive income for the period;  
(c) a statement of changes in equity for the period;  
(d) a statement of cash flows for the period;  
(e) notes, comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and 
other explanatory information; and  
(f) a statement of financial position as at the beginning of the earliest 
comparative period when an entity applies an accounting policy 





retrospectively or makes a retrospective restatement of items in its financial 
statements, or when it reclassifies items in its financial statements. 
For companies on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm specific formal rules apply beyond the formal 
legislation in ÅRL (1995:1554) and BFL (1999:1078). Companies that is actively traded on 
this market must follow the set of rules specified by OMX Stockholm, through the document 
“Regulations for issuers”.  (OMX Nordic Exchange, 2015) 
The general clause, in this document, stated that all information that can change the price of 
the shares should be included and presented to the market, either through statements or 
through the annual report. (OMX Nordic Exchange, 2013) 
During 2015 the general clause changed, chapter three states in “Regulations for issuers” that 
companies active on OMX Stockholm have to disclose all insider information (3.1). What is 
considered as insider information is stated by article 17 in MAR (No 596/2014). It states that 
the information has to contain continuous changes that affect the company, and that the 
company have to share relevant information to the market, such as data that may affect the 
share price.  
This regulation is further complemented by the finance inspectorate law (FFFS 2007:17) (10 
chapter. 3 §) which states that all information that is essential to create a clear picture of the 
company has to be presented, therefore all information that may affect the overall picture of 
the company, or the share price, has to be presented.  
 2.2 Information asymmetry 
“The Market for Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, is a study made 
by George A. Akerlof in 1970. The purpose of the study was to shed light on how asymmetric 
information, as a risk variable, contributes to problems in the market.  
This study is one of the cornerstones of what we nowadays call information asymmetry 
theory. This theory focuses on the problem, that Akerlof described in his paper, which is that 
the seller will always have more information that the buyer, and since there is an incentive for 
the seller to be untruthful, because then he may sell something for more than it actually is 
worth, the buyer will not know for sure if the product for sale is actually in the condition that 
the seller claims it is. Therefore, a demand for more information, from the buyer’s side, is 
created, since they know that there are incentives for the seller to be untruthful, or at least for 
him to not disclose information that will perhaps reduce the value of the product for sale. In 
our case, the buyer is the shareholders, and the seller is the firms.  
2.2.1 Voluntary disclosure 
The annual report is traditionally divided into two parts, a regulated – and a non-regulated 
part. The non-regulated part exclusively contains information that the firms wants to present, 
i.e. voluntary information. In this part of the theoretical framework, different studies 
regarding why firms chose, or do not choose, to disclose this kind of information, will be 
presented.  





2.2.1.1 Competitions influence on voluntary disclosure 
Braam & Borghans (2014) concluded in their study that the social relationship between firms 
may affect what, and how, firms choose to voluntary disclose. They claim that firms will 
likely present similar information, if the relationship between them is healthy. The reason for 
this behavior could be that firms, that have a healthy relationship, discuss what kind of 
information they will present, especially in the cases when the data regards information that 
could possibly be hurtful for the companies. 
By doing this, they may present complex, possibly hurtful, information, without taking a large 
individual blow. Since its very possible that some financial analytic will find this damaging 
information, it´s in the firm’s best interest to present it themselves, thereby giving them the 
opportunity to explain this “behavior” (Braam & Borghans, 2014).  
A study made by Jin (2005) regarding the voluntary disclosure of HMOs stated that these 
kinds of firms use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors. That means that they 
used the non-regulated part as a communication tool, and they therefore chose to present 
information that their customer segment, i.e. persons or institutes that may invest in the firm, 
required. Jin also concluded that the level of competitiveness influenced the magnitude of 
disclosure. In highly competitive markets, companies chose to disclose less than when the 
competition was low. A possible reason for this behavior is that it is harder to differentiate in 
highly competitive markets, since competitors may copy your strategy. So, to summarize, this 
study suggested that competition does not necessarily lead to better, more comprehensive, 
provision of voluntary disclosure, rather the opposite. 
2.2.1.2 Information asymmetries relation to voluntary disclosure 
Falschlunger, Eisl, Losbichler & Greil (2015) claim that firms in Europe usually use graphs, 
key financial variables, and non-key financial variables to exaggerate positive trends, rather 
than using them in accordance with the principles demanded by the IASB, which is that 
information should be presented so that it gives the reader a true and fair view of the 
company. But since IASB, FASB or any other standard setter have not released any specific 
rules about how this information should be presented, this area is up for wild interpretations. 
Even though IFRS only regards the regulated part, Mark & Lorien (2015) claim that after the 
adoption, the non-regulated part became larger, more transparent, and more comparable.  
Since the management commentary is a part of the voluntary report, this concerns it as well. 
Jonäll (2006) found in her study that the CEO’s letter to stakeholders usually present a very 
positive picture of the company. Companies used this letter to represent themselves as a 
fantastic company, by presenting a brighter picture of the company, than what reality would 
show.  
These earlier stated studies presented explanations for why firms would increase the 
information asymmetry, but there are incentives for reducing it as well. Studies has shown 
that disclosure regarding risk, is positively associated with systematic - and financing risk and 
risk-adjusted returns (Elshandidy, Fraser & Hussainey, 2013), put differently, if the quality of 
the report is high, i.e. the information asymmetry is low, then the firm should have a lower 
cost of capital (Herlitz & Nilsson, 2011).  
Another possible incentive for disclosing this kind of information, is that investors nowadays 
expect it, in the form of management commentary and/or operating and financial reviews, in 





the non-regulated part of the annual report (Elshandidy et al., 2013). They also concluded that 
firms who fails to provide data that reduces the information asymmetry, will have to pay for 
it, likely in terms of increased cost of capital, since investors wants to be compensated for the 
additional risk.  
Elshandidy`s et al. (2013) study also indicated that firms, which are publicly noted in the UK, 
are motivated to disclose risk information, since it will likely lead to a lower cost of obtaining 
external funds.  Their research concluded that the data in the non-regulated part mainly 
contains information that is related to risk. Even though this disclosure has reduced the cost of 
capital, which suggests that readers believe what the companies present, there is a rising 
demand from the investors that this part should be audited, in order to enhance the reliability 
of the information.  
A study made by Wang & Hussainey (2013) about factors that may influence the volume of 
voluntary disclosure in UK firms concluded that: 
We find, in the UK context, that board size and board composition (the 
proportion of non-executive directors) are related positively to the level of 
voluntary earnings disclosures. Director ownership and role duality have a 
negative relationship to the level of voluntary forward-looking statements. 
 Firms’ characteristics such as dividend propensity, firm size, profitability, 
leverage, and industry type affect the volume of forward-looking statements 
disclosed in the narratives of annual reports. Furthermore, we find that the 
voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements related to corporate 
governance helps investors to better anticipate future earnings. The 
forward-looking statements unrelated to corporate governance, however, 
have no impact on the share price anticipation of future earnings. 
To summarize these findings: 
1.) Less non-executive directors on the board leads to higher level of voluntary earnings 
disclosures 
2.) Firm characteristics affect the volume of forward-looking statements 
3.) Voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements related to corporate governance 
helps investors to better anticipate future earnings 
Studies suggests that firms that produce large and complex annual reports, tend to disclose 
more voluntary information. The reason is that they try to minimize the negative effects that 
complexity creates, by further explaining and simplifying it in the non-regulated part of the 
annual report (Guay, Samuels & Taylor (2016).  
Even the stakeholders have started to demand more information. Đurić, Knežević & 
Rakočević (2011) found in their study that stakeholders have started demanding more 
voluntary disclosure, financial information and even a higher frequency of released reports.  





An important part of the voluntary disclosure is the CEO: s letter to stakeholders. The main 
objective of this letter is to give the stakeholders a deeper understanding of what the company 
is trying to achieve, as well as to further explain some, or all, complexities that exist in the 
annual report (Jonäll, 2009) and (Adamzon & Wettlegren, 2010).  
 2.3 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is, in simple terms, about that firms want to provide the voluntary 
disclosure that the market demands, in order to be legitimized (Adamzon & Wettlegren, 
2010). In this part of the theoretical framework, studies suggesting why firms would want to 
be legitimized, will be presented.  
2.3.1 Turbulence/Uncertainty 
Haji & Ghazali (2011) concluded that during recession and turbulence, companies have 
increased pressure to be active in social activities, mainly to legitimize the existence of the 
company. The public have higher expectations of the companies to provide more information, 
during times when the financial risk is high. To reduce this legitimacy gap, companies 
increase the extent of voluntary disclosure. Haji & Ghazali also suggest that the amount of 
voluntary disclosure increased significantly after the last financial crisis.  
Studies, like the ones made by Clatworthy & Jones (2003) and Guay, Samuels & Taylor 
(2015) suggest that a possible explanation for the annual reports magnitude, is the current 
state of the reporting firm’s performance. Firms that have declining performance, usually 
produce shorter reports than the ones with improving performance. The reasons could be that 
firms that are doing well, want to show this for the shareholders, which leads to more 
information being produced, while the ones who are not doing so well, focus more on the 
information that is required, and therefore minimize their voluntary reporting.  
One study suggests that firms report similarly at the end of recessions or financial crisis, i.e. 
when the uncertainty decreases. At this time are investors, in general, more concerned about 
safe investments, therefore, companies tend to focus more on sustainable growth, than on 
investments that may perhaps result in high short-term returns (Khurshid, 2016). 
 2.4 Management commentary 
Adamzon & Wettlegren (2010) concluded that there are three psychological theories that may 
explain how the CEO’s letter to the stakeholder’s is designed. These are impression 
management, attribution theory and legitimacy theory.  
Impression management is when the management of the company chose to present 
information that put the company in good favor with the stakeholders, and tries as much as 
possible to either hide the bad information or to explain it in a complex way (Brennan, 
Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce, 2009).  
Attribution theory is about how firms tend to blame bad performance on external factors. 
Adamzon & Wettlegren (2010) and Karlsson & Rutgersson (2014) stated that firms attributed 
all negative aspects of the firm on the financial crisis, even though some of them were not 
related to it.  





Legitimacy theory covers that companies want to provide the voluntary disclosure that the 
market demands, in order to be legitimized. When firm is seen as legit, they will seem to be 
less risky, which should entitle the firm a lower cost of capital (Adamzon & Wettlegren, 
2010).   
 2.5 Setting financial – and non-financial goals 
Some researchers claim that there is no existing relationship between the financial - and non-
financial goals, and that many firms set non-financial goals, without regards to how it will 
affect the financial ones. Elmassri, Harris & Carter (2016) says that firms tend to set non-
financial goals without even trying to calculate the profitability, and that this leads to cost 
ineffective management, and that the explanation is that the social, political, and economic 
pressure is so high, that managers think that not setting a non-financial goal, is even worse 
than setting a terrible one.  
For non-financial goals to be value creating, Boman & Johansson (2003) suggest that they 
should be seen together with the financial ones. To optimize the non-financial targets, they 
should be set so that they may be used as a stepping stone to achieve the financial ones. 
But some studies, like the one made by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky & Bazerman (2009) 
suggest that there are many negative aspects that goals may bring, different from the one 
presented above, that firms tend to ignore. They exemplify this by showing that side-affects, 
like “narrow focus that neglects non-goal areas”, “unethical behavior”, “unhealthy risk 
preferences”, and “corrosion of organizational culture and reduced inner motivation”, are 
products of setting unreasonable, as well as too many, goals.  
Another possible big influence for managers, when they formulate goals, are how these goals 
will reflect the company. Falschlunger et al. (2015) concluded in their study that firms choose 
goals that will make them appear better than they are. 
 2.6 Sustainability 
According to Friedman & Miles (2001), sustainability is a concept that shareholders value 
highly, but their study suggests that there seems to be investors that invest in firms which are 
sustainable, even though the investor is not interested in sustainability. Friedman & Miles 
(2001) suggests that a possible explanation for this behavior may be that the market expects 
sustainable firms to have an increased growth in the future.   
There seems to be a high demand for sustainable firms, which may explain why companies 
have started to act sustainable, and also to report about it, in the form of CSR and 
sustainability reports (Friedman & Miles, 2001). Axelsson & Johansson (2012) claims that 
firms in Sweden originally looked at GRI and sustainability as just another reporting strain, 
but that after a while, it became a reporting praxis. This is in line with the results that Ernfjord 
& Gustafsson (2015) presented, which were that sustainability reports in Sweden has 
increased a lot from 2006 – 2010, which could, according to El Goul, Guedhami, Kwok & 
Mishra (2011) be explained by that firms who follow the sustainability trend gains a higher 
firm value, as well as they lower their financial and operational risk.  





Cormier, Ledoux & Magnan (2010), Seong, Cheol & Pfeiffer Jr (2013) and Hung, Shi & 
Wang (2015) claim that if firms lower the information asymmetry, regarding sustainability, 
they may reduce the shareholders’ investment risk, which in theory should entitle the 
company to a lower cost of capital. All information that reduces the information asymmetry, 
both negative and positive sustainability information, should in theory actively entitle the firm 
to a lower cost of capital.  
The previously presented authors also suggest that sustainability information, that regards 
negative information, reduces the information asymmetry even more than positive 
information does, and that the magnitude of the reductions also is connected to the receiver’s 
knowledge of the subject.  
 2.7 Models 
As stated before, this study is partially a continuation of Åkesson´s (2008) licentiate paper, 
therefore we used the empirical model that he developed. Since this is only partially a 
continuation, we created a new analysis model. In this chapter, we, in general, will explain 
how we used these models.  
2.7.1 The empirical model 
All of the primary data regarding the measurements were registered in an Excel-file to make 
the processing of the data easier. After the registration was done, we used Excel to facilitate 
the design of various diagrams.  
We used a joint form for the complementing qualitative text information that continuously 
was used for all firms. In connection with the processing and presentation of the data-based 
part, the text-based part, that consists of notes about the firm’s goals and measurements, was 
presented in order to complement the diagrams with textual information about the 
development. In the cases were the data from Åkesson`s (2008) study were comparable, we 
included it in the graphs since it may be interesting, even though it is not relevant for this 
study.  
The textual information was exclusively obtained from management commentary, which 
consists of data from the CEO: s letter as well as the chairman’s letter. When this information 
was presented, we chose to not divide these comments, since they both were non-regulated, 
and both of these positions implies that they were on the board.  
We chose to exclusively use management commentary, and not any of the other voluntary 
information, due to reasons that studies on this subject present. Jonäll (2006) and Adamzon & 
Wettlegren (2010) claim that an important part of the voluntary disclosure is the CEO: s letter 
to stakeholders. The main objective of this letter is to give the stakeholders a deeper 
understanding of what the company is trying to achieve, as well as to further explain some, or 
all, complexities that exist in the annual report.  
Clatworthy & Jones (2003) concluded that there is no significant difference in the number of 
pages dedicated to chairman’s statement between improving and declining performance, but 
that all companies included a chairman’s statement, even though it’s not mandatory. The 
CEO: s letter to stakeholders includes the information that most investors read, but 
professional investors overall ranked the CEO’s letter to stakeholders second highest, which 





means that companies find the chairman’s letter as the most important one to stakeholders 
(Jonäll, 2006).  
We used this model to answer the first part of the purpose, which is to describe, and compare, 
which financial – and non-financial goals and measurements that large-cap firms listed on 
NASDAQ Stockholm presented during the period of 2007-2015. 
2.7.2 The analysis model – in general 
The aforementioned studies, which mainly present different points of view of information 
asymmetry and legitimacy theory, were mixed together with the empirical evidence, which 
consists of management commentary, data regarding the non-regulated part of the annual 
reports, and an interview with a former CFO from one of the examined firms. This created an 
environment where we could compare these different kinds of data, in order to present 
possible explanations for the development of voluntary disclosure. Put more simplistic, we 
used legitimacy – and information asymmetry theory to present conceivable solutions for the 
results that the empirical evidence showed i.e. possible explanations for why the firms 
behaved like they did.  
This model was used to answer the second part of the purpose, which is to try to explain and 
identify, in general, how, and why, the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the increasing 
demand for sustainability has influenced/affected the development of the non-regulated part 
of the annual report, in large cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm. How, and if, the 



















In this part of the report we will first present and explain the choice of analysis methods, as 
well as the research papers selections. The models that we used to answer the research 
questions will be explained and motivated, as well as what arrangements we have made to 
strengthen the papers credibility.  
 3.1 Choice of analysis methods  
We used two different analysis designs in this study. The first one is a data-based approach 
which focuses on a specific section of financial data, which in our case consist of data 
extracted from the non-regulatory part of the annual reports. Since it is possible that new 
measurements had been developed during the examined time-period, we chose to not use the 
same checklist that Åkesson (2008) used. Instead, we examined all goals and measurements 
that were presented in the non-regulated part of the annual reports.   
To be able to give this thesis further depth, in the sense of describing and explaining 
development over time, we chose to include non-financial measurements. The reason is that 
unprocessed and non-financial measurement are connected, and therefore influence each other 
(Åkesson, 2008). Companies usually presents measurements that are unprocessed, like 
different kinds of results or amount used for investment, and non-financial measurements, like 
sustainability indexes and/or customer satisfaction. It is notable to point out that the 
examination of non-financial goals and measurements was very limited. Sustainability - 
measurements and goals are a good example of this. Even though there were various types of 
sustainability measurements and goals, like using more sustainable fuel, lowering the 
consumption of unsustainable materials or investing in developing more environmental 
friendly products, we chose to categorize all of these below the caption sustainability. The 
reason is that we were interested in examining the popularity of sustainability overall, not 
individual types of it.  
One of the standard setters in Sweden, when it comes to financial measurements, is the 
Swedish financial analytics association (Sveriges finansanalytikers förening (SFF)) and we 
chose, with some adjustments, to follow their categorization of measurements (SFF, 2015). 
We chose to include the categorizations that Nilsson, Isaksson & Martikainen (2002) use, 
since it gives us categorizes that we feel that SFF missed. 
 Measurements of return 
(ROC, ROTC and ROCE)      
 Stock measurements 
(Ownership structure in %, earnings per share, total dividend, dividend per share, market 
capitalization, equity per share, P/E, return per share, cash flow per share, number of shares 
and number of shareholders)  
 





 Employee measurements 
(number of employees, average number of employees, salaries, pension benefit level.) 
 Unprocessed measurements from financial reports 
(sales, results, cash flows, depreciation/devaluation, minority interest) 
 Margin measurements 
(All different kinds of margin measurements) 
 Capital structure measurements 
(Solidity, leverage, Net debt, Net savings, debt and depositions that are interest bearing) 
 Measurements of investment 
(Investments in tangible assets, investments in intangible assets, total investments, 
investments in R&D, Investments for streamlining R&D, Acquisitions, Streamlining of 
product range) 
 Value based measurements 
(EVA, Market value, increase in market value, Brand value changes) 
 Sustainability  
(All different kinds of sustainability measurements)   
In addition to measurements and goals, complementing data from the annual reports were 
presented. This was to give the reader a picture of possible general changes that the annual 
reports had gone through over time. The possibilities for further analyses increased when 
more background information about the subjects were retrieved. Relatively more pages or 
words about a particular section may in analyses be related to increased interest for some 
stakeholders (Åkesson, 2008). The following general data was retrieved from every annual 
report: 
 Number of pages 
 Number of pages that contain non-mandatory information 
 Number of pages that specifically contains information about the company’s stock 
 Possible occurrence of value added analysis’s.   
In order to give a complementing description of the development, and to explain it, a text-
based part was included in the study. This approach was a textual analysis of the non-
regulated part of the annual report, which is where the goals and measurements, that we 
retrieved, were stated. We understand that textual analysis is a big area and that there are 
multiple ways to do it. We chose to use a content analysis, since the secondary purpose is to 





describe which goals and measurement firms choose to present over time (Åkesson, 2008). In 
the cases when goals could not be retrieved from a specific caption or table, this method was 
used to extract goals from the text. This means in practice that the initial pages, with captions 
like “CEO has the word” and “Financial overview”, were studied extra carefully.   
 3.2 The papers selection  
In this part of the thesis, the different selections, that we made, will be motivated, and 
explained. These are divided into six areas: Annual reports, time-period, selection of 
companies, selection of measurements, selection of evaluation method of the measurements, 
and selection of method for other primary – and secondary data gathering.  
3.2.1 Annual reports 
A longitudinal study requires relevant documents and/or access to significant persons that has 
worked closely with the companies. We chose to use annual reports to describe the 
development over time. When we talked about annual reports we refer to the full document, 
which is divided into a regulated and revised part, and a non – regulated and non – revised 
part.  
We used annual reports as the base of this study, mainly because they are a central part of 
firm´s financial reporting, which according to Jonäll (2006) results in a lot of people studying 
these. Our understanding is that if companies want to present information about their financial 
goals and measurements, then the non-regulated part of the annual reports is the place where 
they will do it. The reason is that financial goals and measurements are clearly related to the 
regulated part of the annual reports. That is why we found the non-regulated part of the annual 
reports as a sublime base to study financial goals and measurements.  
Since the non-regulated part of the annual reports is, as the name states, not regulated, all the 
information in this part is information that the companies choose to present. Every year the 
people in charge of the annual report, make decisions of what to present. These people may 
have been influenced by external consultants or other external factors regarding what and how 
information should be presented (Åkesson, 2008). It is the results of these choices that we 
described and analyzed.  
3.2.2 Time-period 
Because this study is partially a continuation of Åkesson´s (2008) paper, we chose to examine 
the time-period 2007 – 2015. Since Åkessons paper studied the year 1965 to 2004, we simply 
continued where he left of, and by using the three-year interval that he used, we continued 
from 2007.    
3.2.3 Selection of companies 
The selection of companies is based on the fact that this study is partially a continuation of 
Åkesson´s (2008) paper, that is why we, to the utmost extent, tried to use the same companies 
that he used. In practice are publicly noted companies the only type of companies that really 
focuses on what and how presentations of goals and measurement, in the non-regulated part, 
are declared. The choice of study objects may be consolidated by the fact that other 





researchers have used publicly noted companies because they usually are predecessors 
(Åkesson, 2008). 
  
Company  Branch of industry 
Wholesale Manufacturing Forest Shipping Bank, 
ABB  x    
Atlas Copco  x    
Electrolux  x    
Ericsson  x    
Gotlandsbolaget    x  
Investor     x 
Holmen   x   
Ratos     x 
SCA   x   
SEB     x 
Handelsbanken     x 
SKF  x    
Trelleborg x x    
Volvo  x    
Table 1: Examined companies and their industry affiliation 
 
There are four companies that Åkesson (2008) studied which we could not examine. These 
were AGA, Esselte, Skandia and Sydkraft. AGA, Esselte and Sydkraft had been bought by 
foreign investors, and therefore stopped producing Swedish annual reports in the sense that 
they used to. The ones they now made in Swedish are compressed, and were therefore not 
viable to examine. In Skandia’s case, they divided their annual report into business areas, and 
therefore made a consolidated account statement containing only the required parts.  
Since we could not use four of the firms that Åkesson (2008) examined, we chose to include 
two new ones. SKF was included because we felt that we needed another manufacturing firm, 
and Handelsbanken replaced Skandia, since we thought that it would be a good idea to 
include another firm that we could put in the bank, insurance, and securities category. We 
chose to only include two more firms, even though we lost four. The reason for this is that we 
felt that the 14 companies that we examined were enough to represent the different industries, 
and since we did not compare the usage of measurement and goals between different 
industries, like Åkesson (2008) did, there were no reason to further include firms.   
3.2.4 Selection of measurements 
Part of the purpose of the study is to map which financial goals and measurements firms 
chose to present in the non-regulated part of the annual reports, in other words, what 
voluntary financial information they chose to disclose. We only examined the non-regulated 
part, which were usually in the beginning of the annual reports. Many different captions were 
used, but since they were pretty similar, there was not a problem to find them.  





As stated before, the possibility that new measurements had been developed was too high to 
ignore. Therefore, we examined all measurements presented in the non-regulated part, instead 
of following the checklist that Åkesson (2008) used.  
3.2.5 Selection of evaluation method of the measurements 
Financial – and non-financial measurement that do not appear in the non-regulated part of the 
annual report got the value 0. In the next step, we classified presented measurements in two 
groups, target measurements and non-targeted measurements.  
Measurement that were not targeted, either get the value 1 or 2, depending on if they were 
presented in the “introductory pages” or not. The same goes for the targeted measurements, 
which got the value 4 if they appeared in the “introductory pages”, and the value 3 if they did 
not. Practically this meant that we made a part of the analysis in direct connection to the 
measurements.  Gathered in a scheme we classified all the goals and measurement using this 
model. 
 
Model 1: Measurement and goal classification model 
3.2.6 Selection of method for other primary – and secondary data 
gathering 
To gain a better understanding for what factors that influenced the people in charge of setting 
and presenting financial – and non-financial goals and measurements, we chose to interview a 
former CFO from one of the firms that we examined.  
The interviewee shared some sensitive information with us, and is therefore anonymous in 
this paper. The interview was conducted in a semi-structured fashion. This means that we 
made a list of questions beforehand, a so-called interview guide, but we followed it loosely. 





This implicates that we asked one of our questions, but then let the interviewee speak freely. 
The main reason for doing these kinds of interviews is that it reduced the risk of leading the 
interviewee to conclusions that fit well with or study, thereby reducing the objectivity 
(Bryman & Bell, 2008). We also chose to not take notes during the interview, since this may 
affect the interviewees answers (Bryman & Bell, 2008). Because if we only noted some, or 
part of the answers, the interviewee perhaps felt that those are the only subjects that he should 
talk about, and that the other information is not relevant. The transcript of the interview may 
be found in the second appendix.  
The theories and studies that we present in the theoretical framework were mainly, but not 
exclusively, obtained from the data base Business source premiere. The reason is that we 
wanted, to the utmost extent, to use papers that had been per viewed, since those kinds of 
papers usually have a higher validity. When these kinds of papers could not be retrieved, we 
used books and non-per viewed papers.    
 3.3 The papers trustworthiness 
High validity and reliability is of utmost importance, since the purpose of this study is to 
generalize the results that we present. In this part of the study, we will present the 
arrangements that we made to increase the validity and reliability, as well as scientific 
problems that our choice of method creates.    
3.3.1 Validity 
Researchers usually divide validation into two different areas, these are internal and external. 
Internal validity is about how we define what is interesting to study. This affected, in our 
case, how we defined companies’ financial goals and measurements. In order to increase the 
internal validity, we refer to Åkesson (2008) who claim that companies´ financial goals and 
measurements are comparatively easy to define, and that there is a lot of business 
administrative research about financial goals and measurements.  
Due to study technical reasons, we made some major limitations in the theoretical framework, 
as well as in the choice of which events to study. We understand that our knowledge of the 
subject may have affected these selections.  
The external validation was harder to secure. Our strife of creating good material for future 
research resulted in multiple questionable choices. In the selection of firms and time-period, 
we did not see any other clear option other than the fact that we could have used more 
companies in our selection. The firms that were included in the selection represents important 
companies in different branches of industry (Åkesson, 2008). Many of these have won awards 
for their financial reports, and are role models for other firms. We examined the selected 
firms’ annual reports with a three-year separation, which Åkesson (2008) claim is a viable 
interval to secure valid results.  
3.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability is about creating and using the correct parameters, which creates the possibility 
that no matter who do the study, the result will be the same (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This 
means, in general, that we needed to be objective and consistent throughout the study. The 
greatest problem is that we cannot ignore our subjectivity which means that our own values 
will affect the choices we make. To minimize this problem, efforts in the form of 





classifications were made, which created guidelines that we had to follow. We also chose to 
study all annual reports over time that a firm has published, in one session, which gave us an 
insight and understanding for the way they present information (Åkesson, 2008). At the same 
time as we gathered the quantitative data, we also wrote down qualitative information.  
Another reliability challenge was the analytical part of the study. In this part of the study 
exists a clear risk of subjectivity, since our experience and know how in the area may affect 
what we choose to enlighten (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Just as Åkesson (2008), did we not 
expect to find causation, rather was finding and explaining indirect factors that influence 





















4 Presentation and analysis of the empirical material 
In this chapter, the data that have been collected through annual reports and a interview, 
combined with an analysis of it, will be presented. We will in the first part present and 
describe the data, and in the second one, we will use the model of analysis to try to describe, 
in general, the data that was presented in the first part.  
 4.1 Presentation of financial measurements and goals 
In this part of the paper, all the previous classifications of measurements, and how their 
usage has changed over time, will be described. This will be divided into two parts, in the first 
part, the measurements and goals will be described, while in the second part, the 
management commentary will be presented.  
4.1.1 General information 
 
Graph 1: Average number of pages of regulated and non-regulated information. 
The graph shows the total number of pages, as well as how the pages are divided between the 
regulated and the non-regulated part, and its development over time. The length of the annual 
report has been growing steadily over the last 50 years, from 30 pages 1965, to over 150 
pages 2015 
During the first 40 years, the ratio between the regulated and non-regulated parts kept 
relatively stable at 1:1, meaning that the regulated and non-regulated part of the annual report 
were around the same length. From 2004 to 2007 the mean of regulated pages almost doubled 
in size from 44.95 to 85.57 pages, while the non-regulated part was reduced from 58.25 to 
44.43 pages. During the years 2007 – 2015 the non-regulated part grew more than the 
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Graph 2: Mean total pages of stock information. 
This graph shows the development over time regarding how many pages, in average, that are 
exclusively dedicated to stock information. This is something that was non-existent until 
1977. Before the examined period, the mean of stock pages has been a bit volatile, but has 
remained at approximately 2,5 pages since 1989. During the examined time-period, the mean 
reached its highest point in 2010, which is two years after the financial crisis ended.  
Graph 3:  The average number of financial measurements per company per year. 
This graph covers the numbers of financial measurements per company per year, i.e. how 
many financial measurements the companies´ included in their voluntary disclosure. From 
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4.1.2 The development of measurements of return 
 
Graph 4: Average number of measurements of return per company: ROC, ROTC, and ROCE 
The usage of return measurements has been steadily growing from 1971 to 1992, except for 
the time-period 1983 to 1989. After 1995, the popularity of these measurements seems to be 
reducing, until 2013, with the exception of 2004. In 2013 companies presented an average of 
1,42 measurements, which stayed unchanged in 2015.  
The first time a return measurement got targeted was in 1971, but that did not start what was 
later to become an increasing trend. After 1971, not a single firm targeted any of these 
measurements until 1980, but from that year, until 2010, the popularity of targeting return 
measurements increased, from 0,25 in 1980 to 0,95 in 2007. In 2010 the frequency started to 
reduce, and this has been the trend ever since.  
4.1.2.1 Management commentary regarding measurements of return 
In 2007 only two of the 14 examined firms discussed or mentioned return measurements. 
Trelleborg talked about how they could increase their return by actively managing their 
portfolio (Trelleborg, 2007), while Holmen mentioned various arrangements that may 
increase their return (Holmen, 2007). 
Eight of 14 firms discussed, or at least mentioned, return measurements in the management 
commentary section of the annual report in 2010. Some of the firms focused on growth, and 
how to grow while maintaining a high level of return. Atlas Copco commented that: “Beyond 
this point, our focus will be to grow, while preserving a high profitability, as well as a high 
ROCE.” (Atlas Copco, 2010). Electrolux’s CEO commented that: “The fact that we have been 
able to obtain 25 % ROC shows that we, in a successful way, managed to combine a strong 
result with an effective asset turnover ratio.” (Electrolux, 2010).  
In 2013 only four of 14 firms discussed, or mentioned, return measurements. SEB 
commented: “Our most important objective is to create value for our customers, and thereby 
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In 2015 was there a slight increase in the popularity of return measurements. Five of 14 firms 
discussed, or mentioned, return measurements. Two of these were banks, and they were the 
only ones who did not use the measurement ROCE, instead they used ROC (SEB, 2015) 
(Handelsbanken, 2015). 
4.1.3 The development of stock measurements 
 
Graph 5: Average number of the stock measurements used per company; ownership structure in %, earnings per 
share, total dividend, dividend per share, market capitalization, equity per share, P/E, return per share, cash 
flow per share, number of shares and number of shareholders.  
The usage of measurements has grown slowly but steadily. The increase in stock 
measurements can mainly be explained by the increase in value 1. In 2015 value 1 accounted 
for 6.07 out of the total 7,7.  
 
The targeting of stock measurements has not been especially popular during the examined 
time-period. In 2007 the average was 0,42 and it increased to 0,5 in 2010, which also was the 
highest mean during this time-period. After 2010, the popularity has only decreased, to finally 
end up at the mean 0,21 in 2015.  
 
4.1.3.1 Management commentary regarding stock measurements 
Six out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned stock measurements in 2007. Most 
companies discussed different kinds of stock measurements. SCA did not specifically cover 
share information in management commentary but had pages on share information directly 
connected to the management commentary (SCA, 2007). ABB talked about earnings per share 
and SKF disclosed an increase in dividend per share (ABB, 2007; SKF, 2007). Volvo spoke 
about how long-term profitability creates share value (Volvo, 2007). Ratos overall had a good 
year and did not feel the effects of the upcoming financial crisis in 2007, therefore discussing 
the increase in share return (Ratos, 2007). Investor on the other hand was more affected by the 
financial crisis and talked about how tough the year had been for their shareholders (Investor, 
2007). 
10 out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned stock measurements in 2010. Six companies 
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Handelsbanken discussed both dividend per share and earnings per share (SKF, 2010; 
Handelsbanken, 2010). Ratos had a though year and talked about how their share was 
unpopular, due to the fact that the market had systematical shortcomings while evaluating the 
companies owned by them (Ratos, 2010). 
Electrolux (2010) had a whole part where they covered share information and stated:  
“Our intensive efforts in recent years to reduce tied up capital and improve 
cash flow has contributed to a stronger future so that we may focus on both 
faster growth and a continued high dividend rate. Over the past ten years, 
we have given our shareholders a total return of an average of 26 percent 
per year, compared to the average 11 percent on OMX Stockholm” 
In 2013, Seven companies discussed or mentioned stock measurements. Four of them covered 
information about dividends per share. The rest used various stock measurements, for 
example Ericsson used earnings per share (Ericsson, 2013), ABB used yield per share and 
Investor used both total dividends and dividends per share (ABB, 2013; Investor, 2013). 
Six companies discussed or mentioned stock measurements in 2015. Three companies used 
dividends per share, two yield per share, and the rest of the companies used different stock 
measurements. Ericsson kept the same measurements as in 2013, earnings per share (Ericsson, 
2015). ABB changed the measurements from 2013 and used total dividends and dividends per 
share (ABB, 2015). Handelsbanken used the measurements earnings per share and dividends 
per share (Handelsbanken, 2015). 
4.1.4 The development of employee measurements 
 
Graph 6: Average number of employee measurements used per company; number of employees, average number 
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The overall trend is that firms use these measurements less and less, since the usage of the 
measurements decreased from 1,22 in 2007 to 1,12 in 2015. The year with least usage is 2010. 
Value 1 is the most used value in 2010. During 2013 and 2015 value 2 is more than twice as 
high than value 1.  
4.1.4.1 Management commentary regarding employee measurements 
In 2007, two out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned employees. Investor stated that 
“Competent employees are the foundation of our value creation” (Investor, 2007) while SEB 
stated "In tough times, it is important to have employees of the highest quality and to 
encourage creativity. These are areas of priority for the board.” (SEB, 2007). 
Two out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned employees in 2010. SKF claimed that the 
employees were a big reason for the strong results the company had (SKF, 2010). Atlas 
Copco expanded their business, hired 3000 new employees, and held education programs for 
them (Atlas Copco, 2010). 
In 2013, five companies discussed or mentioned employees. Two of them held education 
programs for their employees. Handelsbanken stated that: ”We will also expand our 
recruitment base, not only to bring in new kinds of skills to meet new kinds of challenges - 
but also in terms of diversity, so that we become a bank whose employees reflects the society 
in which we operate” (Handelsbanken, 2013). Ratos stated that “operational experience of 
industrial advisors is an important prerequisite for value creation” (Ratos, 2013). Holmen had 
a tough year and had to lay off employees in some business areas (Holmen, 2013). 
Two out of the 14 companies discussed or mentioned employees in 2015. Ericsson held an 
educational conference with 250 of the company’s senior executives (Ericsson, 2015). Atlas 
Copco expanded the service division of the company, to further help the customers. Atlas 
Copco also stated that: “Our skilled staff makes all the difference, so investment in their skills 










4.1.5 The development of unprocessed measurements from financial 
reports 
Graph 7: Average number of unprocessed measurements from financial reports used per company: sales, 
results, cash flows, depreciation/devaluation, minority interest,  
In 2007, the average usage was 2,5. In 2010, these measurements popularity increased, 
followed by a slight increase in usage in 2013. The usage stayed at the same level in 2015, as 
it was in 2013.    
The popularity of targeting these measurements increased from 2007 to 2010 and has then 
stayed at the exact same level.  
4.1.5.1 Management commentary regarding unprocessed measurements from 
financial reports 
In 2007, seven out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned these measurements. Operating 
profits was the most discussed measurement. SKF talked about operating profits and cash 
flow (SKF, 2007). Volvo were the only company discussing total sales (Volvo, 2007), and 
Atlas Copco discussed cash flow and operating profits (Atlas Copco, 2007). 
Nine out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned these measurements in 2010. The most 
discussed measurement was operation profits, which nine companies talked about. Two 
companies discussed information regarding cash flows. SKF were the only company to 
discuss increased sales (SKF, 2010).  
In 2013, eight out of 14 companies discussed or mentioned these measurements. Just as the 
prior years, the most discussed measurement was operation profits, which six companies 
talked about. Two companies mentioned cash flows. Ericsson discussed growth in total sales, 
and Volvo talked about deprecation (Ericsson, 2013; Volvo, 2013).   
Nine of the 14 companies discussed or mentioned these measurements in 2015. The most 
popular measurement was operation profits, which 4 companies discussed. Two companies 
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4.1.6 The development of margin measurements 
 
Graph 8: Number of companies that presented some type of margin measurement 
There were always nine firms that presented margin measurements during the examined 
years. The only thing that changed was how they presented it, i.e. if it was in the introductory 
pages or not, and if it was targeted or not.  
The targeting of margin measurements only changed one time, and that was from 2007 to 
2010, where six firms, instead of four, targeted this measurement. Since 2010 have always six 
firms target this kind of measurement.  
4.1.6.1 Management commentary regarding margin measurements 
In 2007, four firms discussed or mentioned margin measurements. Trelleborg discussed that 
better operation effectivity led to better operating margin (Trelleborg, 2007).  
In 2010, six firms discussed or mentioned margin measurements. Two firms discussed 
EBITDA margins, and Ericsson, ABB and Electrolux discussed operating margin (Ericsson, 
2010; ABB, 2010; Electrolux, 2010).  
Only two firms discussed margin measurements in 2013. These were SKF and Electrolux, and 
they both discussed operating margins (SKF, 2013; Electrolux, 2013) 
In 2015, four firms discussed or mentioned margin measurements. Electrolux, Trelleborg and 
SKF discussed operating margins, while ABB mentioned EBITDA margin (Electrolux, 2015; 
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4.1.7 The development of capital structure measurements 
 
Graph 9: Average number of capital structure measurements per company: Solidity, leverage, Net debt, Net 
savings, debt and depositions that are interest bearing.  
In 2007 the average use was 1,5 measurements per company and increased to 1,83 in 2010. 
The usage decreased both 2013 and 2015. In 2015 the average usage was 1,62 measurements 
per company. 
In 2007 the mean of setting capital structure goals was 0,5 measurements per company, and 
this decreased to 0,43 in 2010, but after 2010 the goals set on these kinds of measurements 
has only increased, and in 2015 the targeting has roughly doubled in popularity in comparison 
to 2007.   
4.1.7.1 Management commentary regarding capital structure measurements 
Four of 14 companies discussed or mentioned capital structure measurements in 2007. 
Handelsbanken, SEB and Investor talked about turbulence, and that they had decreased their 
leverage, because of the financial crisis (Handelsbanken, 2007; SEB, 2007; Investor, 2007).  
Five of 14 firms discussed or mentioned capital structure measurements in 2010. Electrolux 
stated that: “Our increased work the last year, regarding lowering our leverage, has 
contributed to our forthcoming focus on faster growth, as well as a continued high dividend.” 
(Electrolux, 2010). The other firms talked about their efforts for reducing costs and lowering 
their leverage.  
Only two of 14 firms discussed or mentioned capital structure measurements 2013. Both of 
them talked about future and current plans for maintaining a low financial risk.  
In 2015, Four of 14 firms discussed or mentioned capital structure measurements. Once again, 
financial risk and improvements of leverage was the main topic of discussion. SKF even 
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4.1.8 The development of measurements of investment 
 
Graph 10: Average number of investment measurements per company: Investments in tangible assets, 
investments in intangible assets, total investments, investments in R&D, Investments for streamlining R&D, 
Acquisitions, Streamlining of product range.  
Investment measurements were quite popular in 2007. The mean in 2007 was 1,79, but then 
decreased in 2010 to 1,2. But after 2010, investment measurements has slowly started to 
increase in popularity again.   
Of all the examined years, 2007 was the one where targeting investment measurements were 
most popular. In 2010, it is not only less popular, it was only set as a goal by one firm. In 
2013 firms started targeting investment measurements again, but there were only a few 
companies that did it, since the average usage is 0,2. The same average is seen in 2015. 
4.1.8.1 Management commentary regarding investment measurements 
Nine of 14 firms discussed or mentioned investment measurements in 2007. Four of these 
talked about R&D, and the rest, except one, discussed different types of acquisitions. The one 
firm that were not talking about R&D or acquisitions is SCA. They instead focused on 
investments with the sole purpose of strengthening their brand. (SCA, 2007). 
In 2010, 10 of 14 firms discussed or mentioned investment measurements. Eight of those 
talked about R&D, while the rest, except one, discussed different types of acquisitions. The 
company that did not talk about acquisitions is SKF, they discussed investments in 
streamlining the production (SKF, 2010).  
10 of 14 firms discussed or mentioned investment measurements in 2013. All ten of these 
firms talked about R&D and two of these also discussed acquisitions.  
In 2015, 10 of 14 firms discussed or mentioned investment measurements. All ten firms 
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4.1.9 The development of value based measurements 
 
Graph 11: Average number of value based measurements per company: EVA, Market value, increase in market 
value, Brand value changes 
Value based measurements were not very popular during the examined time-period. In 2007 
and 2010, the average usage was 0,5 measurements per company. In 2013, the mean 
decreased to 0,35, and decreased even further in 2015, resulting in an average usage of 0,21.  
The development of targeting value based measurements did not follow the progress of the 
total usage of the measurements. In 2007, the average targeting of value based measurements 
was 0,14, but even though the mean regarding the presentation of these measurements did not 
decrease in 2010, so did the goal setting. Not a single firm targeted value based measurements 
in 2010, but both in 2013 and 2015 one firm targeted one of the measurements.  
4.1.9.1 Management commentary regarding value based measurements 
There is not a lot of companies that discussed or mentioned value based measurements in their 
management commentary. In 2007, only Investor mentioned one of these measurements, and 
that was market value (Investor, 2007). 
In 2010, two firms mentioned these kinds of measurements. Electrolux talked about market 
value changes in their brand, and Investor, once again, talked about the market value of their 
assets (Electrolux, 2010; Investor, 2010).  
In 2013, both Investor and SCA discussed one of these measurements, Investor talked about 
market value (Investor, 2013), and SCA stated that: “SCA has a lot of strong global and 
regional brands that contributes to mediate who we are and what we stand for” (SCA, 2013). 
Investor was the only company that discussed any of the value based measurements in 2015. 
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4.1.10 The development of sustainability measurements 
 
Graph 12: Number of companies that presented a sustainability measurement. 
Sustainability measurements have been highly popular during the examined time-period. In 
2007 and 2010, 12 respective 13 firms reported a sustainability measurement, which indicate 
that almost all firms discussed or mentioned sustainability in their report. In 2013 and 2015 all 
firms talked about sustainability.  
Even though sustainability goals are very popular, they have not increased during the 
examined time-period, which the presentation of it did. Still, the targeting has stayed at a high 
level.  
4.1.10.1 Management commentary regarding sustainability measurements 
Nine of 14 firms discussed or mentioned sustainability in their management commentary in 
2007. In 2010, seven of 14 firms discussed or mentioned sustainability. Electrolux stated that: 
“Of all the trends that has driven the demand the last years, the customers increased 
environmental awareness has been the strongest one” (Electrolux, 2010). The other firms 
discussed topics like reducing the environmental damage, increased social responsibility, 
creating sustainable value and so on.  
In 2013, 12 of 14 companies discussed or mentioned sustainability in their management 
commentary. The topics were pretty much the same as earlier year, which may be concluded 
from quotes from SCA respective Volvo: “Innovation and sustainability is what pursues the 
business” (SCA, 2013) and “Sustainability focus will give us the maneuvering space that we 
require to continue our investments in product development, growth in new markets and in the 
end, fulfill our vision of becoming the world leader in sustainable transportation solutions” 
(Volvo, 2013).    
In 2015, all firms, except SEB, discussed or mentioned sustainability in their management 
commentary. Once again, the topics were the same. Electrolux state that: “Sustainability is the 
main topic on our agenda” (Electrolux, 2015) and Investor say that: “Sustainability is a 
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 4.2 Analysis of financial goals and measurements 
In this part of the paper, the earlier stated events will be discussed and analyzed by using the 
model presented in 2.7.2. Important to note is that even though the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, the increasing demand for sustainability, and their influence on voluntary disclosure 
overall will be analyzed, the first part, which regards the adoption of IFRS, will only focus on 
IFRS: s influence on the volume of voluntary disclosure.  
4.2.1 IFRS influence on the volume of voluntary disclosure 
In 2005, IFRS is introduced in Sweden. At the same time as it was introduced, it also became 
mandatory for firms notated on NASDAQ Stockholm to follow and incorporate these new 
regulations and recommendations. Even though this legislation only affect the regulated part 
of the annual report, studies suggest that the introduction also had effects on the non-regulated 
one.  
Mark & Lorien (2015) states that the non-regulated part has become larger, more transparent, 
and more comparable. But if we look at the empirical evidence, we see that the pages of non-
regulated information have decreased from 2004, i.e. before IFRS was adopted, to 2007, after 
adoption. In 2004, the mean of non-regulated pages was 58.25, and in 2007 it decreased to 
44.43 pages. These findings are in accordance with the information received during our 
interview, where the interviewee stated that their voluntary disclosure had not been influenced 
by the adoption of IFRS standards, nor did he think that any other large-cap company had 
been (Appendix 2). 
Worth noting, however, is that, ever since 2007, the amount of voluntarily disclosed 
information has steadily increased. Compared to 2004, the average number of pages was 60.1 
in 2015, which is equivalent to a pre-adoption increase. The implication is that even though 
there was no increase at the time of the introduction, the average number of pages of 
voluntary disclosures has, in fact, increased since the adoption of IFRS. However, it is 
important not to confuse correlation with causation. 
One study, which examines the affect IFRS have had on voluntary disclosures, made on 
companies listed on NASDAQ Stockholm, showed that the number of non-regulated pages, in 
average, increased in 2005, compared to 2002 (Broberg, Tagesson & Collin, 2010). Why our 
empirical evidence tells a very different story, may be due to the fact that we only examined 
firms in the large-cap region, where as the aforementioned study observed firms from all 
different classification regions. Hence, it may be possible that firms, who are listed on 
NASDAQ Stockholm, overall, increased the amount of voluntarily reported information, but 
that large-cap firms did not. 
While the number of voluntary pages has increased significantly overall, the empirical 
evidence show that the number of measurements, during the examined time-frame, only 
increased by 0.5. This suggests that the increase in voluntarily disclosed information is not 
due to an increase in measurements. Instead it could be due to a perceived need to disclose 
more non-regulated information, caused by other factors, such as those described by 
legitimacy theory, and information asymmetry.  





4.2.2 The financial crisis of 2007-2008 
Studies suggest that when firms are subjects of turbulence, society will increase their demand 
of information, mainly because of the increased financial risk (Đurić, Knežević & Rakočević, 
2011; Haji & Ghazali, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Haji & Ghazali (2011) also claimed 
that after the last financial crisis, voluntary disclosure increased. Possibly in order to decrease 
the information asymmetry, and thereby gaining a lower cost of capital (Herlitz & Nilsson, 
2011). This is in line with the empirical evidence, since the mean increased from 44.43 in 
2007, to 49.5 pages in 2010.  
Even though studies suggest that firms mainly tend to discuss positive aspects (Falschlunger 
et al., 2015; Jonäll, 2006), they do also touch upon some of the negative ones. However, when 
they do, many of them blame negative outcomes on the recent years of economic turbulence. 
For example, management commentaries, addressing these issues, present depictions in the 
following manner: “The decreased demand is due to the state of the market” (Electrolux, 
2010), “Toward better times after years of macroeconomic challenges” (SEB, 2010), “Still 
great uncertainty in the capital markets” (Handelsbanken, 2010), “Unpopular share due to 
systemic errors in the market” (Ratos, 2010), “Weak markets” (Gotlandsbolaget, 2010), and 
“Bad year for our investors due to turbulence” (Investor, 2007). This behavior is in line with 
attribution theory (Adamzon & Wettlegren, 2010; Karlsson & Rutgersson, 2014), and the 
results from the study made by Clatworthy and Jones (2003), which are that firms tend to take 
credit for the positive aspects, while blaming bad ones on externalities. Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003) further state that firms, on average, produce more voluntary disclosure when they 
improve their performance. Taking this into account while analyzing company statements 
from 2010 – where comments such as: “Back to our targeted capital structure” (Investor, 
2010), “Strengthened competitiveness” (ABB, 2010), “The year of recovery” (Atlas Copco, 
2010), “A very strong year” (SKF, 2010), and “Great prerequisites for 2011” (Trelleborg, 
2010) can be found – we may conclude that 2010, indeed, was a year of performance 
recovery. As companies, on average, increased their voluntary disclosure in the same year as 
increased performance was a subject of discussion, it implies that companies increase the 
amount of disclosed non-regulated information parallel to an increase in performance 
(Clatworthy & Jones, 2003). 
10 of the 14 examined firms discussed growth in their management commentary in 2010. 
Most of them presented similar information, like development, operational profit, and 
investments. This is in harmony with Khurshids (2016) study, where he claims that firms 
show identical behavior, putting emphasis on firm growth toward an ending of a financial 
crisis, the reason being that investors are concerned about long term returns. However, when 
firms engage in this type of behavior, it is likely that they mainly focus on positive outcomes, 
and even exaggerating positive trends, even though the reality can be far from pleasant 
(Jonäll, 2006; Falschlunger et al., 2015). The implication is that firms may use the non-
regulated part of their annual report as a form of communication tool, conveying what they 
think are marketable information (Jin, 2005). That the non-regulated part of the annual report 
is used as a strategic way of marketing the company is further supported by the interviewee, 
who stated that, in times of turbulence, the firm chose to focus on marginal measurements, 
instead of growth or sustainability in return (Appendix 2). 
Some studies, like the one made by Brennan et al. (2009) states that firms do not only try to 
present positive information, but also tries to hide the bad information or explain it in a 
complex way. The latter is in direct conflict with answers given by the interviewee, who 





stated that even though they did not focus on the negative aspects, they at least tend to explain 
possible complexities, not create them. No matter which of the two behaviors are more 
generalizable, common practices for both is to not focus on the negative aspects of the 
business. Since multiple studies (Cormier et al., 2010; Seong et al., 2013; Hung et al., 2015) 
have found that presenting negative information reduce information asymmetry far greater 
than presenting positive information, it is not a forgone conclusion that companies 
communicate to reduce risk, originating from asymmetric information. Being sure not to 
stretch the logic, why companies would focus on presenting positive information could be the 
context in which their presented information would be analyzed. Presenting negative 
information while competitors present positive information could put the business in a 
negative spotlight relative to the competitors (Braam & Borghans, 2014).   
This seems like a reasonable explanation, since Khurshid (2016), as earlier stated, claim that 
firms report similarly at the end of financial crisis, which is in accordance with the empirical 
evidence. The interviewee stated that in times of turbulence, they started to target margin 
measurements instead of return measurements, which we see that the examined firms have 
done as well. The targeting of return measurements decreased by approximately 23,1 % 
between 2007 and 2010, while the targeting of margin measurements increased by 14,3 % 
between 2007 and 2010. During the interview, the interviewee stated that, in times of 
turbulence, the company also focused more on capital structure measurements. Our empirical 
findings support this statement, showing an increase in capital structure measurements of 23,8 
%, between 2007 and 2010; which was also the year that capital structure measurements 
achieved its highest popularity. 
4.2.3 Sustainability 
One of the most influential organizations, regarding sustainability, is the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), which was founded in 1997. GRI states on their website that: “GRI provides 
the world´s most widely used standards on sustainability reporting and disclosure, enabling 
businesses, governments, civil society and citizens to make better decisions based on 
information that matter. In fact, 92 % of the world´s largest 250 corporations report on their 
sustainability performance.” (Globalreporting, 2016). The UN global compact is also a large 
influence in the sustainability reporting community (Unglobalcompact, 2016). Since Sweden 
in December of 2016 adopted a sustainability reporting act, sustainability could be looked at 
as a very important subject from a Swedish perspective. The newly adopted law states that the 
regulations and recommendations, for example from organizations such as GRI and UN 
global compact, are suitable when formulating a sustainability report (6 chapter. § 10 ÅRL 
1995: 1554). What is important to note here is that the aforementioned law was not in place 
during the time-period examined by this study. 
As 12 of 14 firms presented sustainability measurements, and 11 of these also had targeted 
measurements, you can say that sustainability measurements, and hence also sustainability 
related goals, have been very popular. Every firm presented sustainability measurements 
during the years 2013 and 2015, but the frequency in targeting had its peak in 2007 and 2013. 
Yet, why sustainability measurements are high in demand is everything but a forgone 
conclusion.  
Some studies suggest that shareholders value sustainability, and that firms that are, or act 
sustainable gains higher firm value, as well as lowered financial and operational risk. As 
demand for sustainable firms has increased, it was not hard to understand that the willingness 





to provide information accordingly (Friedman & Miles, 2001; El Goul et al., 2011), which the 
study made by Ernfjord & Gustafsson (2015) claim that firms in Sweden have done.    
Since sustainability has not been regulated, but in contrast has been characterized by a 
pluralistic supply of recommendations and reporting standards, it is easy to understand that 
someone who is not familiar with the subject, perceive sustainability as a subject of analyze 
which is complex. Nevertheless, even if sustainability clearly can be perceived as difficult to 
understand, it can still be identified as something important. Thus, as Cormier et al. (2010), 
Seong et al. (2013), and Hung et al. (2015) states: firms which accomplish to lower the 
sustainability related information asymmetry, reduces shareholders’ investment risk and, 
hence, also the firm’s cost of capital. They uniformly state that the asymmetry at hand is 
reduced even further if the receiving part, i.e. investors and shareholders, are knowledgeable 
of the subject. Using the non-regulated part of the annual report to “educate” the receiving 
part, in order to reduce the information asymmetry even further, could be an explanation of 
the increased size of voluntary reporting.  
We also conclude that sustainability was one of the main topics in many of the managerial 
commentaries. This conclusion was drawn from statements like: “Of all the trends that has 
driven the demand the last years, the consumers increased environmental awareness has been 
the strongest” (Electrolux, 2010), “We strive to reduce our environmental impact” (ABB, 
2010), “Our goal is to become the leading environmental firm in our industry” (Electrolux, 
2015; Volvo, 2013; Volvo, 2010), and “Our customers trust our company to be engaged in 
social responsibility, as well as long term sustainable mind-sets” (Trelleborg, 2013). Some of 
these firms address subjects, stating that they were “working in accordance with the UN:s 
Global Compact regulation and recommendations”, “engaged in human rights activities”, and 
“acting socially, and environmentally responsible.” (Holmen 2015). 
In contrast to findings presented in earlier studies, Emassri et al. (2016), for example, claim 
that firms set non-financial goals, not because of the possibly reduced cost of capital, but 
because the demand from shareholders, as well as the social, political, and economic pressure, 
is so high. Because of this, managers think that not setting non-financial goals is even worse 
than setting terrible ones. Since studies suggest that non-financial goals only should be set if 
they may be used as a stepping stone to achieve the financial ones, this can – since the goals 
merely are set for the firm to be considered as legitimate – possibly be damaging for the firm 
(Boman & Johansson, 2003). If these goals are not correctly set, which might be the case 
when talking about external pressure, the non-financial goals may not only be hard, but 
impossible to achieve if firms engaged in these types of activities are not ready to sacrifice 
other activities, or higher levels of profitability. Put differently, it may be unfeasible to try to 
reach both the financial, and non-financial goals simultaneously (Ordóñez et.al., 2009; 
Tammemagi, O`Hora & Maglieri, 2013). 
During our interview, sustainability was a topic which was brought to attention more than 
once. The interviewee stated that: acting sustainable, and offer products which are 
environmental friendly, are great sales arguments. He further stated that even though there are 
not any legal requirements, shareholders and customers expect firms to act sustainable. The 
interviewee stated that: 
 






 “In the beginning, no one cared about sustainability, but there was still 
some interest in the subject. But all of a sudden, when others start to care 
about it, it becomes popular, and suddenly, you are not in the loop, if you 
do not catch on to the trend. This kind of development, let us call it informal 
demands, of course matters. Equality was also such a phenomenon. Since 
everyone else was reporting about it, it became natural for us to do it as 
well.”    
The comment suggests a behavior that is in harmony with what studies have claimed about 
sustainability increasing in popularity due to demand from shareholders, as well as 
companies’ pursuit to become/stay legitimized. It is also in line with Axelsson & Johansson´s 
(2012) results, where they claimed that originally, firms looked at sustainability reporting as a 
burden, but when the concept became established, firms thought this kind of reporting was 





















This part will include a short summery of the conclusions made in the prior chapter. Finally, 
suggestions for future research will be presented. 
 5.1 Analytical conclusions 
How, and why, in general, has the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and the increasing demand 
for sustainability, influenced/affected the development of the non-regulated part of the annual 
report, in large cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm, and how, and why, has the adoption 
of IFRS had an impact on the volume of voluntary disclosure?  
Our study suggests that the introduction of IFRS has not created an identifiable gap in the 
voluntary disclosure. Even though the adoption of IFRS has preceded an increase in the non-
regulatory information disclosure, in terms of volume, the empirical evidence does not imply 
causation. On the contrary, our findings suggest that the adoption of IFRS standards has had 
no, and in some cases a negative impact on the non-regulatory volume. Analogically, we 
argue that the adoption of IFRS has not had an impact on the usage of measurements. 
In contrast to the impact IFRS seems to have had, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 seems to 
have had a large impact on the usage of measurements, as well as the volume of voluntary 
disclosure at large. The identifiable gap, in this case, is the increased uncertainty that the 
financial crisis created, which seems to have had an effect on the shareholders’ demand for 
information related to this issue (Đurić, Knežević & Rakočević, 2011; Haji & Ghazali, 2011; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013). One possible explanation could be that, due to uncertainty, the 
information asymmetry, or perceived information asymmetry, had increased. Hence, in order 
to reduce the increased risk, firms disclosed more information related to the issue at hand. 
However, the increased information asymmetry could create a contextual framework where 
disclosures, related to the financial crisis, were regarded as legitimate. If that was the case, 
firms would, hence, disclose information, not because of the perceived increase in asymmetric 
information, but due to the fact that being the only one, or one of the few, who did not present 
such information, could be bad. 
After the crisis, the examined firms started to produce longer annual reports, and once again 
returned to their original area of focus, i.e. growth and long term returns. This follow the 
tendencies reported by a study made by Clatworthy & Jones (2003) where they claim that 
annual reports increase in size as a firm starts to improve their performance. 
The increasing demand for sustainability seems to have had a large impact on the way firms 
act and report. The identifiable gap here seems to be that shareholder increasingly values 
sustainability higher and higher (Friedman & Miles, 2001; El Goul et al., 2011). Firms seems 
to have responded to the increased demand for sustainability related information, implied by 
the topics of managerial commentaries, as well as by the interviewee (Appendix 2), by 
increasingly talk about, and report upon the subject. One explanation could be that an 
increased demand of sustainable businesses caused an increase in the information asymmetry 
in terms of sustainability. Not coping with this new demand trend could mean increased costs 
of capital (Cormier et al., 2010; Seong et al. 2013; Hung et al., 2015), as well as investor-
leakage, either to competing firms who disclose more information, or to other industries. Put 
differently, the increase in non-regulated disclosures could be due to companies fearing to 
miss out on crucial investments, or increased costs of such investments. Nevertheless, 





increasing a company’s sustainability presence could be due to factors involving the 
legitimacy theory. If being sustainable has nothing to do with actual practices, and more to do 
with strategic, as well as superficial marketing, not engaging in such communication could 
mean being regarded as an inferior alternative, relative your competitors (Adamzon & 
Wettlegren, 2010). This latter conclusion could be seen as strengthened by the fact that 
studies have clearly established negative information as more risk reducing than positive. As 
earlier studies (Jonäll, 2006; Falschlunger et al., 2015), as well as the empirical evidence, in 
addition to the interview (Appendix 2) presented in this paper, agree on that firms focus on 
presenting positive information, it becomes hard to argue that this behavior can be explained 
by information asymmetry theory. On the contrary, being seen as legitimate relative your 
competitors, seems as the more likely explanation. 
 5.2 Empirical conclusions 
How has the occurrence and the number of financial- and non-financial goals and 
measurements changed over time in large cap firms listed on NASDAQ Stockholm´s non-
regulated part of the annual reports? 
Measurements of return decreased in popularity, as well as the targeting of them.  
Stock measurements slightly increased in popularity, and so did the targeting of them. 
Employee measurements decreased in popularity, and were only targeted in 2010. 
Unprocessed measurements from financial reports increased slightly in popularity, and so did 
the targeting of them. Margin measurements did not increase nor decrease in popularity, but 
the targeting of it did.  
Capital structure measurements increased in popularity in 2010, but have since then decreased 
in popularity. But the targeting of these measurements decreased in 2010, and then increased 
in 2013. Measurements of investment were quite popular in 2007, but decreased by 33,3 % in 
2010. After this year, the measurement has slowly grown in popularity once again, the same 
trend goes for the targeting of them. Value based measurements have not been popular, 
neither has the targeting of it. Sustainability measurements have been extremely popular. 
Almost all examined firms presented such measurements, and the majority of them targeted a 
sustainability measurement as well.   
 5.3 Suggestions for future research 
One part of the studies purpose was to describe how the occurrence and the number of 
financial- and non-financial goals and measurements changed over time in Swedish public 
companies` financial reports. We wondered why these changes, in both individual 
measurements and in the categorized measurements, occurred. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to try to explain the changes in popularity of these measurements in depth, instead 
of generally like we did in this paper.   
Another interesting research area would be to examine all measurements and goals that firms 
in Sweden have presented during the years 1965 to 2015. Then you would be able to describe 
the development of measurements and goals over time, and see when new measurements and 
goals are introduced.  
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In this chapter, the transcription of the interview, as well as the interview-guide that we used, 
will be presented.  
 7.1 Transcription 
Former CFO in a large cap company listed on OMX Stockholm. 
JS: Julius Sundström 
JÅ: Johan Åkesson 
RS: Robin Svedberg 
Interviewee: X 
JS: Vi fortsatte bara där Johan slutade, han slutade 2004 så nu har vi kört därifrån till 2015. 
Egentligen är det samma studie, vi kollar från hur många sidor det är, det ser man ju överlag 
att sidantalet ökar bara, det blir bara mer och mer I årsredovisningen. Så det är väl, egentligen 
att fortsätta med det, försöka ta reda på det, du hade (JÅ) varför målen formulerade på det 
sättet från 1965 till 2004 och nu försöker vi egentligen ta reda på om det är samma 
anledningar eller finns det andra anledningar nu varför målen ser ut som de gör. Vilka mål var 
i fokus då, och vilka mål är I fokus nu?  
JS: Vi har ju en hel del stickfrågor men det överlag är det inte några väldigt stora frågor, så du 
får känna efter lite, var du själv vill börja så vi flika in om det är något vi funderar mer på. Så 
egentligen är första största frågan är, vilka var det centrala val som gjordes när ni framställde, 
när ni formulerade de finansiella målen? 
X: Nu pratar vi om finansiella mål som står i årsredovisningarna som man kör externt va. [Ja]. 
Sen är det ganska många företag som har inte nödvändigtvis precis samma mål internt. 
Utgångspunkten är att det ska hänga ihop och stödja varandra, men man får betrakta det 
externa som lite överordnade möjligtvis. Först ur styrningssynpunkt så går man ofta ett steg 
länge, utvecklar det hela på något sätt. På [Large cap company] till exempel, nu ska vi se 
måste tänka efter, det har gått några år, så jag måste tänka efter vilka mål vi hade. Vi ändrade 
över årens lopp men det byggde princip på rörelsemarginal, tillväxt och kapitalanvändning. 
Return capital employeed hade vi också, ja juste precis det diskuterade vi. Jag har inte 
förberett mig, det har gått tre år.  
Så de målen använde vi externt, och de var ju basen för hur vi ville utvecklas och styra 
företaget, vad vi ville uppnå naturligtvis. Vad vi kommunicerade till aktieägare och alla andra. 
Internet utvecklade vi detta till en styrmodell som byggde på, vi kallade den, en EVA modell. 
Vi kallade den för TVA bara för att inte använda exakt samma uttryck som användes externt. 
Den byggde också på en rörelsemarginal som vi hade en schabloniserad kapitalkostnad som 
var hyggligt professionellt framräknad, men inte på decimalerna precis, på olika valuta och 
sådana där saker. Så fick man ett EVA eller TVA som var det som vi använde som det interna 
styrmålet som vi satte budgetar utifrån, gjorde investeringsbedömningar, gjorde incentive 





program och så vidare utifrån. De externa målen var av nödvändighet måste de vara lite 
enklare kan man säga för man klarar inte kommunicera med hela omvärlden om en teoretisk 
modell om man uttrycker så. Den som följer det måste kunna se i rapporten om man är 
framme eller inte om man uttrycker det så utifrån redovisningen. Det finns andra företag som 
gör på precis samma sätt, jag sitter i styrelsen på [Large financial company] till exempel. Där 
kör de också, det är en mer finansorienterad verksamhet kan man säga, där har de en vinst per 
aktie tillväxt som primärmål, som det externa primärmålet, men internt jobbar man med en 
EVA modell. Med ett rörelseresultat minus en cost of capital, så det är bara som en liten 
bakgrund. Så vad var ni frågan, hur vi kom fram till de här målen? 
JS: Ja exakt, vilka som var valen som gjordes när man formulerade målen. Du har nämnt ett 
här till exempel här att det måste vara enkelt, det måste vara lätt att förstå, jämförbart helt 
enkelt. 
X: Absolut, det måste vara lite långsiktigt, man måste känna att det här är någonting som man 
inte behöver ändra om ett, två eller tre år. Sen någon gång ska man ändra det men det får inte 
gå för fort. Det måste vara lite långsiktigt, det också viktigt och då kan man fundera hur man 
ska uttrycka det i termer av att man ska uppnå ett givet mål om tre år, eller fem år eller 
någonting sådant där. Eller ett mål som ska gälla över en konjunkturcykel som vi ska sträva 
mot, då blir det lite vagare med en gång kan man säga. Vi körde nog I [Large cap company] 
alltid med ett mål som vi såg, vi uttryckte inte det som ett mål över en konjunkturcykel men 
det var en målnivå som vi ville ligga på och finnas runt omkring om man uttrycker det så. 
Skälet till det var att man kanske inte ville bli fastnaglad vi ett givet år när man är ett 
konjunkturberoende företag, där det trots allt går lite upp och ner.  Satte man då ett mål för 
2020, och det visade sig vara ett risigt år på grund utav världsekonomin så, ska man svara på 
den fråga också om man uttrycker det så, det är bättre att sätta ett mål för den typen av företag 
i varje fall som siktar mot en nivå som man vill uppnå och ligga kring. Hur gick det till när vi 
satte våra mål, det beror på, vi gjorde ett antal omgångar. Vi kan ta ett senare år, slutet på 90-
talet, när [Large cap company] var I en liten kris man vi kalla det, minikris I varje fall, det var 
inte riktigt stor kris men en liten minikris sådär 97/98 I varje fall, vd sparkades, ny vd kom in. 
Det fanns behov att göra en hel del omstruktureringsaktiviteter och sådant där, i varje fall fick 
man göra sig av ett par dåliga bitar, men sålde även ett par bra bitar.  
JÅ: Var det då [subsidary] såldes? 
X: Det var det år [Subsidary] såldes ja, det var den bra biten. I vårt fall så tittade man på ok, 
hur ser vår affär ut, vad är förutsättningarna, vad är det vi kan åstadkomma nu de närmaste 2-
3 åren. Det var ungefär den horisonten lade vi, vid den tidpunkten när nya VD hade kommit 
in. Vi diskuterade vilken typ av mål vi skulle ha, men vi var ganska tidigt överens att 
margninalmål är det som passar bäst. Då tror jag vi bara hade marginalmål och ett return on 
capital employeed. Jag tror inte vi pratade tillväxt I det läget, för att då var läget lite 
annorlunda, då handlade det om att krympa ihop och konsolidera snarare än att expandera. Vi 
formulerade då 8% rörelsemarginal, för då hade vi varit nere på 0 och en liten förlust med 
omstruktureringskostnad, 8% rörelsemarginal och så en return och capital employed som jag 
inte kommer ihåg nu men som kanske var 20 eller något sådant där. Det baserades på det 
arbete vi gjorde, top-down och bottom-up, där man går igenom vad har vi för förutsättningar, 
vad kan vi åstadkomma med den här verksamheten i marknaden efter 
omstruktureringsaktiviteter och under normala förutsättningar så lade vi fast det. Så nådde vi 
de målen kanske kvickt, jag skulle gissa på redan 2000 eller 2001 möjligtvis. Så då fanns det 





anledning, vi såg att vi fick momentum, verksamheten utvecklades väl på olika sätt, på alla 
sätt nästan. Det gick bättre och bättre. Så då fanns det anledning att revidera de där målen, för 
vad som händer när man når en målnivå man satte upp på 8% och kommer nerifrån, det är är 
ju att alla, analytiker, aktieägare och andra fråga, ska ni inte bli bättre, vad ska hända 
framöver och sådant där. Då kan man säga att man ligger kvar på denna nivå, men tror man 
att man har förbättringspotential finns det nog anledning både externt och internt att sätta upp 
något nytt som man vill uppnå, nytt strategiskt arbete som vi naturligtvis gjorde vart eller vart 
annat år. Så såg vi väl förutsättningarna för att kunna lyfta den där mål nivå till 10%, vilket vi 
då gjorde. Det var inte konstigare än så, det var samma process, man tittar på 
förutsättningarna, man ser vad man kan, tror kan göra och åstadkomma. Man har diverse olika 
idéer, projektidéer och så vidare om förbättringar och aktiviteter och strukturomvandlingar i 
branschen och all vad det nu är för någonting och så lägger man det i målet. Så den där 10an 
nådde vi kanske 2003 eller något sådant där, 2002-2003. Så var det VD byte, så gjorde vi om 
processen igen kanske 2003-2004 I varje fall och då formulerade vi 12% som marginalmål, 
för vi hade förbättrat verksamheten och förutsättningarna fanns. Så jobbade vi efter det i ett 
antal år, och låg runt 12% sträcket, några år i varje fall. Vi gjorde väl en dipp naturligtvis i 
krisen 2008, men var snabbt tillbaka och var väldigt lyckosamma I återhämtningen sen, gjorde 
några bra förvärv och blev väl lite för kaxiga och sa att 15% kan vi nog nå. För då hade vi 
legat runt 13% ett par år tror jag om jag minns rätt, eller i varje fall mer än ett, efter ny 
process så landade vi i alla fall på 15% marginalmål, jag tror vi hade 25% på return on capital 
employed och då hade vi också, det gjorde vi kanske även 2004 då lade vi till ett tillväxt mål 
som var runt, jag kommer inte ihåg vad det var då men om det var 5-7% eller någonting 
sådant där. Det har vi med oss hela vägen, justerade kanske någon procentenhet men då 2004 
blev det tillväxt och marginal i kombination. Så var det, de 15% nådde vi kanske något 
kvartal men vi nådde det inte helhetsmässigt, jag tror faktiskt att de har dragit tillbaka det till 
12% men jag är inte riktigt säker på det just nu. Men de ligger runt 12% nivån.  Så har det 
hela sett ut över tiden och processerna har varit på det sättet. Det är enkelt, det handlar 
egentligen om att ha utgångspunkten att förstå var man befinner sig och försöka se vad man 
kan åstadkomma med verksamheten med organiska förbättringar, investeringar, förvärv eller 
den väg man väljer så att säga. Sen kommunicerar man det och så har man då, så säger man 
att man ska nå 12% så har man naturligtvis planer att man ska nå 13%, så man har lite kudde i 
det, ur ren självbevarelsesynpunkt kan man väl säga. Men ungefär så går en process till I de 
flesta företag tror jag, så jag gissar att ni hör samma story om ni pratar med andra eller något 
liknande i varje fall. 
JS: Jag tänkte i den här processen, är det just CFO och Vd:n som har mest att säga till om eller 
är styrelsen in där också och har?  
X: Styrelsen kommer naturligtvis in i bilden , och det kan alltså vara olika, i olika företag. Det 
kan vara en styrelse som är pådrivande, och det kan också vara så att det sker i 
företagsledningen. I [Large cap company]s fall var det alltid i företagsledningen kan man 
säga, och vi ville väl ha initiativet kring de här frågorna, man jobbar igenom sin process , man 
pratar med styrelsen att ni håller vi på med detta och så får vi se hur det kommer ut , och så 
beskriver man sina tankegångar för styrelsen och har genomgångar om sin strategi , vad man 
ska kunna åstadkomma de närmaste åren, och som en följd av det har vi fastnat för att vi vill 
kommunicera följande mål också till marknaden. Sen så hur man sköter det internt är de inte 
lika noga med, men det är klart att en styrelse är väldigt angelägen att de mål man 
kommunicerar till marknaden är genomtänkta och fungerar, sen kan det vara olika hur man 





driver det. I vårt fall var det väldigt mycket i, hela arbetet skedde i ledningen med styrelsens 
gillande om man uttrycker det så. 
JS: Var det mycket stridigheter, att de vill skicka en viss signal men medans ni kände att det 
här är lite att ta i... 
X: Nej aldrig varit så, det har varit väldigt, det blir någon sorts interaktiv process. Man kör 
normalt sett I det flesta företag ett strategiarbete varje eller vart annat år. Oftast är det så att 
man gör en stor strategiplan I något läge, det är en förändrad situation, det har gått lite dåligt 
och man behöver ruska om det, eller det kanske händer något på marknaden, eller kanske 
bara, en ny vd till exempel, då är det också naturligt , eller nya styrelseledamöter för den 
delen också. Lite det för man det väl ändå vart tredje år, stort arbetet där man verkligen går 
igenom förutsättningarna, marknader, konkurrenter, vad finns det för möjligheter och så 
vidare. Så uppdaterar man i regel den där planen en gång om året, möjligtvis vart annat 
beroende på lite grann hur, vad det är för typ av bransch, hur snabbrörligt saker och ting är. 
Efter ett sådant strategimöte, då har man styrelsen men de vet ju om att man tänker göra en 
sådan plan, man beskriver lite grann tankegångarna inför det, styrelsen säger förhoppningsvis 
att det låter ju bra, tänk på följande, titta på det men det är sällan något bråk om sådana saker. 
Sen landar den där planen upp då , efter ett halvår eller något sådant igen i styrelsen, då 
presenterar man grundligt, så här har vi tänkt och jobbat igenom, så här ser det ut, det är det 
här vi vill göra de närmaste åren och vi tror vi kan leverera följande resultat och därmed vill 
vi sätta följande mål, man kan lika gärna säga att vi vill inte ändra våra finansiella mål därför 
att de fortfarande är giltiga, eller någonting sådant och det kan ju ett sådant läge som vi var 
inne på tidigare, kan ju också att man säger att styrelsen skulle kunna vilja att man sätter ett 
givet marginalmål för ett givet år och sådant där, men i vårt fall har det aldrig varit några 
problem, vi har aldrig haft något bråk eller några problem runt egentligen. När det går 
hyggligt om man uttrycker det så, man levererar på de mål man satt upp och allting så blir det 
ju sällan några problem, då är styrelsen i regel nöjd. Hur det gick till nu 2014 , jag tror de 
sänkte sitt mål till 12% och hur den processen gick till vet jag inte riktigt, men jag tror inte det 
var något större väsen om det, man har nog konstaterat att förutsättningarna ser lite 
annorlunda ut, vi var lite för optimistiska då 2011/2012 när de förra målen sattes. 
JS: Så det är ingen större skillnad vem som sitter i styrelsen eller vem som är vd, processen 
ser ofta ganska likadan ut? 
X: Ja det tror jag, skillnaden kan naturligtvis vara om det är , det kan vara spänningar mellan 
styrelse och ledning naturligtvis som gör att det blir på ett annat sätt, det kan vara väldigt 
olika från företag till företag. Det kan också vara så att ett företag som har underlevererat lite 
grann under några år och kanske gått lite halvknackigt och så kommer det några in nya 
styrelsemedlemmar, ny ordförande, ny vd kanske som höjer kraven, och då kan det ju bli lite 
skarpare diskussioner, men det där är normala processer. Styrelsens jobb är att ledningen är på 
tårna, och ledningen ska se till att styrelsen nöjd, i princip kan man säga. I sista ändan blir inte 
aktieägarna nöjda heller om styrelsen inte är nöjd så att det handlar ju om någonting om alla 
egentligen stävar efter i grund och botten. 
JS: Tittar ni också mycket på konkurrenterna, liksom vilka finansiella mål de använder, är det 
lätt att man använder samma just för att de använder det och för att aktieägarna vill ha 
jämförbarhet, eller hur går det till? 





X: Vi tittar alltid på konkurrenterna naturligtvis, inte så mycket ur den här aspekten, vad de 
hade för mål dels för att det inte var någon perfekt grupp, några japanska företag med väldigt 
låga marginaler och sen fanns det egentligen bara ett börsnoterat företag till av våra 
huvudkonkurrenter. Det är klart vi tittar på konkurrenter men det var inte det avgörande i 
målsättningsarbetet. 
JS: Det var inte så ifall ni såg att ni satte ett mål på 10% och de satt ett mål på 15%, nu måste 
vi… 
X: det hade varit lite jobbigt hade man kunnat säga, men situationen var inte , i ett par andra 
företag om man tar, ofta är det ju så att man är I en marknad där man inte har exakta 
konkurrenter, man jobbar med flera olika produktområden eller vad det är . Ofta har man inte 
en konkurrent som är precis jämförbar utan det är väl ofta lite blandat, men om vi tar [large 
financial company], som är i en bransch där det finns ett par andra spelare med liknande 
förutsättningar, där tittar vi nog lite mer till konkurrenterna och hur vi förhåller oss till de och 
så vidare. Att man presterar lika eller bättre. Så det är lite olika jag tror det beror väldigt 
mycket på bransch till bransch, har man bra jämförelseobjekt eller inte.  
JÅ: Får jag sticka in en stickfråga där, om man nu tänker sig såhär att eftersom det känns ju 
nu som den viktigaste biten är att ens egen historik ungefär, höjdhopparen vill alltid hoppa lite 
högre. Då tänker man så här att, ett alternativt mål I en sådan bransch, som [Large cap 
company] och andra företag är i , är att bli mer marknadsdominerande, man vill bli större. För 
att ta marknadsandelar, om vi sänker våra mål, då blir investeringar mer lönsamma och sänker 
vi marginaler kan vi också ta marknadsandelar organiskt. Fanns det någon sådan diskussion i 
det hela för att det är klart att man skjuter upp målet till 15% för då måste vi hålla de här 
priserna i Bulgarien och då kommer vi inte kunna ta marknadsandelar från konkurrenterna, 
gjorde man sådana trade offs? 
X: Nja, lite grann har man det kanske. Mer och mer har i de verksamheter gått från det tänket, 
att man ska sänka priser för att ta marknadsandelar fungerar väldigt sällan. Det var en av 
drivkrafterna kan man väl säga I 90-tals övningen på [Large cap company], när vi kom I den 
här lilla minikrisen. Då var det exakt det som skedde, man prioriterade upp tillväxt 
ambitionerna och det ledde bland annat till, det var inte uttalat att man skulle sänka priser för 
att ta marknad, men det blev en konsekvens om man säger som så, och det var det som drog 
oss ner under några år. De resonemang vi sen kom in I, var i stället att vi måste flytta oss så 
att säga, förhållande till kund och affär och göra vår produkt mer kvalificerad och inte slåss 
om pris. Klart att priset alltid kommer har betydelse men vi måste ha bättre produkter och mer 
avancerade produkter som ger mer värde för kunden för att kunna hålla bra prisnivåer och ta 
till och med bättre betalt. Vi hade alltid på [Large cap company] en strävan att kunna höja 
priserna lite grann hela tiden, inte på en given enkel produkt utan göra produkten lite mer 
sofistikerad och därmed få lite bättre betalt. IKEA däremot ligger helt annorlunda, jag tycker 
det här är intressant. Jag har I hela mitt liv, alla år på [Large cap company]  I alla fall så har vi 
efter 90-tals eran hela tiden jobbat med utgångspunkt, mer värde till kund och bättre marginal. 
Bättre marginal kan man ju få större volym och lägre pris naturligtvis också men det fungerar 
bara i väldigt, det fungerar inte i marknader där du har få spelare. Att prisutveckling på våra 
produkter var viktigt på [Large cap company], att de skulle upp någon procent om året, på 
grund att vi gjorde bättre grejer och kunden skulle vara beredd att betala. På IKEA är det 
precis tvärt om, när man pratar prisutveckling så pratar man hur mycket man kan sänka priser, 
det är med en annan utgångspunkt som är helt kulturell om man uttrycker det så. 





Möbelbranschen är naturligtvis oerhört mer fragmenterad än [product] och de produkterna 
som [Large cap company] håller på med, med begränsat antal spelare. Möbler håller tusentals 
spelare på med, det blir en annan dynamik där, men IKEA har byggt under alla år på större 
volymer, man har inte egen tillverkning, I varje fall I väldigt liten utsträckning, 10% av det 
man säljer tillverkar man själv. Det handlar om att man har underleverantörer som man kan få 
att sänka sina priser för att de får större volymer och sen så låter man det gå hela vägen ut till 
kund. Så är man effektiva och de större volymerna ger skalfördelar och därmed kan man växa 
vilket man gjort rätt framgångsrikt kan man säga. Så att den kulturen och den affärsmodellen 
sitter stenhårt i IKEA och det var nog den kulturen som [Large cap company] då trodde på i 
mitten av 90-talet att man skulle kunna anamma, den affärsmodellen. Bättre volymer, 
skalfördelar, lägre pris till kund, ytterligare bättre volymer som kommer ur att kunden köper 
mer. Men i den sortens industri eller verksamhet som [Large cap company] var eller är räcker 
det inte att sänka priset med ett par procentenheter, vi möter konkurrenterna direkt, 5% till 
och med eller vad som helst. Det blir ett priskrig istället och det skadar alla, så är det. Men nu 
ska vi se, tillväxt kan vi komma tillbaka till för att när vi införde tillväxtmål 2003/2004 så var 
det ju också med utgångspunkt från den drivkraften men ändå att växa resultatet, det var alltid 
primärmålet. Resultatmålet går före tillväxtmålet, men får du upp volymen och har en given 
marginal så får du ut bättre siffra längst ner så det är liksom en naturlig kombination, och det 
här med kapitalavkastning också kunna göra det på ett kapitalsnålt sätt. Tillväxtmålet kom till 
för att det var en drivkraft i att förbättra resultatet i absoluta tal över tiden. Det är mycket 
roligare att växa förstås, all verksamhet vill normalt sett utveckla i att bli större, fler kunder, 
fler affärer så att säga, det är det det handlar om.  
JÅ: De är också en stickfråga, för det är en av de teorierna som man kallar 
företagsledningsmodeller, att det är en oerhörd drivkraft för många liksom för det skapar en 
högre status, vi blir större, trädet blir större... 
X: Jag tror inte man ska tänka så mycket termer status, det finns säkert med också naturligtvis 
så att man vill hellre att om man har en given verksamhet att den ska omsätta 10 miljarder än 
7 miljarder, allt annat lika det finns ju ingen baksida, allt annat lika. Men det är också väldigt 
mycket det, man lever med sin marknad, sina kunder, sin affär. Det är en framgång att man får 
fler kunder, fler kunder som är beredda att betala mer, det är ett sätt att mäta hur duktig man 
är, hur konkurrenskraftig är, vill kunderna inte köpa dina grejor så är det inte så bra 
antagligen, inte tillräckligt mycket värde. Det är ju a och o, kan man inte sälja någonting blir 
det inget tillslut, så enkelt är det ju. 
JS: Jag tror nog att du lyckats svara på de flesta av frågorna om formulerandet av finansiella 
mål, för det var just lite det här hur ni influeras av trender men det sa du ju att ni tittar på 
konkurrenter men det är inte avgörande i processen, sen gick du också in hur ni formulerar 
mål när det är turbulens, just att ni hoppar över tillväxtmålen då, istället tog med kortsiktiga 
mål. Det var just finansiella mål vi tänkte fråga, sen gå in på själva innehållet I 
årsredovisningen, hur det ser ut där. Var det något mer om finansiella mål du tänkte på eller 
så? 
RS: Jag tänkte lite om det skett lite om det skett någon förändring att ägarna har vissa krav 
vad de vill se I själva årsredovisningen, men det kommer sen också, eller intressenter överlag, 
i stort 





X: Det kan man ju uttrycka i form av storägare, eller i form av aktieanalytiker. 
Aktieanalytiker vill alltid ha mer, det kan man alltid säga generellt sätt. Det vill förstå varför 
man sätter vissa mål. Generellt sätt kan man säga att de var väldigt nöjda med marginalmål, 
ett tillväxtmål och ett kapitalavkastningsmål. Det ger allt som aktiemarknaden och den sortens 
intressenter är intresserade av I alla fall. Sen är det, också intressant för de externa målen, 
kanske ligger utanför vad ni håller på med, men de passar inte 100% bra för marginalmål är 
aldrig några problem, inget av de är egentligen något problem, men det är bättre om man 
internt sen kan omsätta det där i något som väldigt tydligt och lätt kommer ut i den interna 
rapportering som varje enhet har och att då omsätta det i en EVA modell, tyckte i alla fall jag 
och I [Large cap company], alla tyckte faktiskt det. Det blev väldigt framgångsrikt, var bra. 
Då landade man tillslut i ett mål som täckte allting, når du en TVA förbättring, du kan ju göra 
det genom att sälja mer med samma marginal, vara lika med samma kapital, men du kan 
jobba på alla de parametrarna och det kondenseras ner i en enda siffra till slut. Så att som 
intern styrmodell är det väldigt bra att göra så, folk ska ha inte det för krångligt när det ska 
driva affärer utan de ska vara enkelt, det är jätteviktig grej, annars funkar det inte så bra i 
verkligheten.  
JÅ: Jag kan ta en stickfråga innan ni går in på årsredovisningsdesign kanske då, och det är 
egentligen då redovisningsreglernas betydelse. Du har varit med en ganska lång period när 
man har ändrat i redovisningsreglerna och IFRS genomförande och sådana saker. För det är 
också en sådan förståelsefråga från de som läser, är ett kapitaleffektivitet alltså 
räntabilitetsmål samma sak idag som före IFRS, och det är ju inte riktigt det. Tog ni hänsyn 
till sådana saker eller diskuterade ni då, ni ser ju egentligen samma saker när ni går in I TVA 
modellen, är den också utsatts för redovisnings... 
X: Man kan säga när man har den sortens mål som är ändå ganska generella, ett marginalmål, 
påverkades nog aldrig de tror jag inte. Det är klart att det här med, har man höga goodwill 
avskrivningar tidigare, sen försvann det och blev något annat och skrev av det på andra 
materiella tillgångar men inte på goodwill och så vidare så påverkade. Men för [Large cap 
company] var det aldrig någon fråga, men för andra företag skulle det kunna vara det, företag 
som varit väldigt förvärvstunga. Men då löser man oftast det genom att man pratar om EBITA 
mål istället. Kapitalsidan, ändrade pensionsredovisningen, det har betydelse men oftast var det 
inte så mycket så att det fanns anledning att göra justering på grund av det utan det kom i så 
fall när man gjorde den större justeringen något år senare eller när det nu blev. 
JS: Det var inget mer ni tänkte på med finansiella mål. 
JÅ: Det var en liten stickfråga, det är ju egentligen då, för du har ju en sådan där sak som 
också har diskuterats ganska mycket medialt nu, inte minst senaste 5 åren, handlar ju om det 
här med i och med att ränteläget sjunkit I hela vår omvärld och så, så skulle man kunna tänka 
sig att liksom att herregud alla de här avkastningskraven går ju ner nu liksom, nästa 
tvåprocentiga tal i vissa lägen. Det låter ju inte alls på dig som att det är, ni har fortsatt mer, ni 
ska vi hoppa högre, nu ska vi hoppa högre och det är klart, när man börjar närma sig ett 
avkastningskrav på 25% på sysselsatt kapital så inser man också vad det blir till eget kapital, 
vänta nu. Den här klassiska modellen hur man bygger upp ett avkastningskrav på eget kapital 
stämmer ju plötsligt inte då. 
X: Nej det gör det inte, men det där tar nog han som sig själv därför att vi sänkte 
avkastningskravet på sysselsatt kapital efter förvärv, man kunde inte köpa företag med 





utgångspunkt på 20–25% avkastning på det utan det kröp ju neråt. Kapitalmålet justerades då 
i ett par omgångar tror jag, om jag minns rätt nu. Med utgångspunkt från de, inte med 
utgångspunkt från ränteläget egentligen, av det enkla skälet att även, nu har det hänt väldigt 
mycket senaste åren, för när jag fortfarande var aktivt var räntor ändå ett par procent. Jag vet 
att när sista större uppgången vi gjorde då lånade vi för 1,8% på 7 år, det tyckte alla var 
fantastiskt. Nu tror jag att man kan låna under 1%, eller det kan de rättare sagt. För ändå var 
det så att i avkastningstankarna så låg också vad är aktiemarknadens krav på avkastning, och 
den steg ju lite grann och riskkomponenten steg lite grann kan man säga också. Man försökte 
göra en liten WAC bedömning så var det inte så stor skillnad som man kunde tro, det var en 
ganska modest skillnad. Det gjorde väl en liten grann men ingen dramatiskt. 
JÅ: Vad hade ni för upplåningskostnad om du nu backar tillbaka 10-15 år? 
X: Ja då var det väl säg runt 2004/2005 var kan det varit då, det kanske var runt 5% eller 
något sådant där. Jag minns inte säkert, 5–6 I den storleksordningen. 90-talet var den såklart 
ytterligare högre, kanske runt 10. Men vi lånar i olika valutor beroende på mixen såg ut.  
JS: Men då hoppar vi vidare till själva årsredovisningen, då tänkte vi just också nu igen 
kommer en jättestor fråga, men hur ser processen ut när man väljer vad som ska vara I den 
icke reglerade delen av årsredovisningen.  
X: Pratar du specifikt om målen nu eller talar du allmänt? 
JS: Allmänt om icke reglerad information. Vi har sett nu att det är en trend, hela vägen från 
1965 ser man ju det att storleken på den icke reglerade delen bara ökar och ökar. Varför väljer 
man att, varför valde ni att ännu mer krut på den biten? 
X: Egentligen kan man säga att det är väl två drivkrafter , det ena är att man vill beskriva mer 
om företaget, berätta vad vi håller på med för att öka förståelsen hos aktieägare och andra 
intressenter som läser den, hur våra marknader ser ut, konkurrentavsnitt lade vi in kom jag 
ihåg till exempel, produktområdesbeskrivningar och sådana där saker, och i vårt fall var det 
ganska bra utveckling av det skälet att folk kan inte så mycket om [product], vad det finns för 
olika [product] eller andra produkter runt omkring som gör att maskiner fungerar bättre. Det 
är väl något som rullar tänker man, lite så enkelt är det ju inte. Det var ju ett sätt att utbilda 
aktieägare och andra, och sen är finns det alltid ett säljelement kan man säga, man vill sälja 
sitt företag på ett positivt sätt. Man vill gärna skriva om saker som man tycker man gör bra 
och som man vill lyfta fram, det kan vara sustainability, det kan vara vad som helst, det som 
man tycker man är framgångsrik på. Sen skrev man inte alltid lika mycket på sådant som inte 
var så bra på, av naturliga skäl. Egentligen var det väl det, utbildning, information och sälj om 
man nu uttrycker det så. Sälja företaget som koncept och som företaget betraktat, varumärkes 
byggande och så vidare. 
JS: Där måste ändå trender påverka mycket, för man ser ju nu speciellt från 2004 och framåt 
att alla har hållbarhet. Alla har mycket information, många har egna bilagor om hållbarhet. 
X: Kraven har i och för sig växt också, även på den icke reglerade delen tror jag. Inte så att 
det finns formella lagkrav utan att det finns förräntningskrav vad som ska finnas där. Du har 
det här med hållbarhetsredovisning, som ju ofta nu är integrerad i årsredovisningarna. Från 





början, var det väl ingen som brydde sig om det överhuvudtaget tänkte jag säga, men det här 
var ju lite intressant och helt plötsligt när andra gör det blir det stort, och så helt plötsligt så är 
man inte med på banan om man inte har det och så vidare. Den sortens utveckling, låt oss 
kalla det informella kravet spelar också en roll naturligtvis. Jämlikhet var en annan sådan där 
sak, hur ser det ut i koncernen med kvinnliga chefer och allting sådant där, blev också 
naturligt ämne att ha med för att alla andra gör det, de flesta andra.  
JÅ: Vilka sneglade man på då, när man säger alla andra. Var det så att ni hade någon som satt 
och läste och tittade lite vad gör de andra?  
X: Dels så läser man ju årsredovisningar när man är i branschen, men det är ju 
kommunikationsavdelningar, marknadsavdelningar, det där föll in på olika sätt på de som 
faktiskt var ansvariga för att producera årsredovisningen.  
JÅ: För ansvaret låg på dig? 
X: den låg både hos kommunikation och CFO tillsammans, för att det är ett 
kommunikationsdokument. Men det där jobbar man, men tar fram en idé under hösten, vad 
ska man ha nästa år. Kanske till och med på våren när den andra var ute. Hur blev det här, så 
pratade man, vad ska man satsa på nästa år. Många gånger vill man göra ett professionellt 
arbete så man hade klart allting, och sen lade man upp en riktlinje för hur den skulle se ut 
nästa år. Sneglade naturligtvis ett antal andra, titta på trender, utgå från vad är viktigt att 
berätta om det vi håller på med nu och för [Large cap company] till exempel tror det var 2010 
just på sustainability sidan gjorde vi väldigt stora ändringar av det enkla skälet att vi tog 
interna steg som var väldigt viktiga, både i arbetet internt och i de produkter vi har, [product] 
bidrar till minskad energianvändning, jättebra säljargument, hur rätt i tiden som helst. Klart vi 
måste driva på och jobba med det, sätta mål kring det och så vidare och så vidare. Det blev en 
väldigt naturlig konsekvens att också skriva om det I årsredovisningen naturligtvis, för att det 
var viktigt för företaget och för affären framöver. Trend som vi hakar på eller var med och 
utvecklar är samma.  
 
JS : Jag tänkte också på de första sidorna, ni har kört mycket på att ha nyckeldata. Ni har en 
sådan lista. Varför valde ni just de nyckeltalen för vi såg ibland att de ändras från år till år. 
Det skulle vara en sak om det var samma sak hela tiden, men ibland byttes vissa nyckeltal ut 
mot andra.  
X: Det kan jag inte svara riktigt på, det var väl mer att ha en sådan kort uppställning, jag tror 
vi ofta I alla fall, jag har gjort några årsredovisningar under årets lopp. Ofta hade man en 
väldigt kort sammanfattning, vad är [Large cap company]. Produkter, produktområden, 
kunder, marknader och lite sådant där och lite nyckeltal som sagt. Det var väl snap-shot, bra 
att kunna ge en överblicksbild av det som man uppfattas som viktigast just nu, varför man 
ändrade talen just där kan jag inte svara på. Det ändras över tiden, vad som man tycker är 
viktigt. 
JS: Jag tänkte just, om det var att man ville presentera de måtten man lyckats med absolut bäst 
det året. 





X: Det kan det ju ha varit, men jag tror nog att det var någon konsistens över åren, jag tror 
inte vi bytte. Det minns jag faktiskt inte, det kan jag inte riktigt relatera till. Vi gjorde alltid en 
väldigt liten, en sådan här liten broschyr, eller vad den nu heter på svenska. [Large cap 
company]  in a nutshell hette den nog.  Läste man den fick man ett väldigt bra begrepp, den 
var inte mer än kanske, 8 sidor, i den storleken. Jag vet inte om de gör den fortfarande, den är 
jättebra. Lite bolagsinformation, lite finansiell fakta, hade du den visste du vad var de för 
företag I grund och botten. Sen hade 160 sidiga årsredovisningen något att tillföra 
gissningsvis, men ändå. 
JS: Dock så där i början så kommer VD har ordet, jag tänker på själva utformningen där, är 
det enbart vad VDn vill säga eller är det just att ni sätter er ner, det här borde vi diskutera? 
X: Hos oss var det lite olika, men i regel var det att VD skrev sitt utkast så var vi några 
stycken som hade synpunkter. Si eller så istället, man diskuterade på det sättet, nästan alltid 
kan jag säga så kom VD ordet från VD men sen bearbetades det på vägen utav sådana som jag 
och kommunikationsfolk. Det finns säkert olika vägar att göra detta i olika företag.  
JÅ: Hur många VDar upplevde du? 
X: Fyra 
JÅ: Var de olika i säg i sådana saker? 
X: Just VD ordet tror jag alla ville skriva själva. 
JÅ: Hade ni någon gång att ordförande skrev en sådan sak med? Det noterade jag i min studie 
att det trender på 90-talet. 
X: Jag tror vi hade det ett par år när det gick sämre, då är ju det ett sätt för styrelsen att visa att 
man är på det. Det var inte så populärt kan jag säga. Det var väldigt länge sedan.  
JS: Sen är det lite det här som jag har funderat mycket på, om det är någon uppföljning på 
själva årsredovisningen. Det känns som det börjar bli oerhört stora, finns det någon process 
för de är otroligt tidskrävande och kostsamma att göra nu när det börjar komma upp i 200 
sidor, det är ett otroligt arbete. Finns det någon uppföljning om det faktiskt är någon som läser 
det, om det är faktiskt vad intressenterna vill ha, eller är det just för att det är trender, man har 
gjort så förut? 
X: Jag måste meddela att jag kommer inte ihåg, vi gjorde uppföljningar och jämförelser på 
olika sätt. Man fick ju också från omvärlden, i Sverige fick man från aktiespararna och 
ytterligare någon institution som gjorde, rankade årsredovisningar utifrån innehåll och kvalité, 
jag minns inte riktigt vilka det var.  
JÅ: Det var inte de som gjorde bästa årsredovisningen du tänkte på där? 
X: Jag minns faktiskt inte nu, men det tittade vi naturligtvis på. Tyckte de att vi var dåliga på 
det avsnittet så får vi väl skärpa oss till nästa år, men sådant här är typiskt, personligen tyckte 
jag vi gjorde för mycket, för omfattande årsredovisningar av det enkla skälet att det finns 





ingen som orkar läsa. Många årsredovisningar från många företag, det blir lätt en tendens att 
man vi ha med allt, man vill berätta allt, bland annat för att får poäng i sådana här 
undersökningar så att kommunikationschefen kan får pris, eller vad det nu är. Jag tycket det är 
blandat, jag tycker att det är lite för mycket. Kostnad spelar inte så stor roll i och för sig, 40 
sidor till när man ändå gör 160 gör inte så mycket, distributionskostnaden spelar mindre roll 
efterhand, nu är det inte så många som skickas ut som man gjorde förr. Förr skickades 
årsredovisningar till alla aktieägare, det gör man inte längre i regel, om man inte begär att få 
så får man inte. 
JS: Turbulens måste väl också påverka vad ni väljer att ta upp i den delen, jag tänker på 
finanskrisen, kanske lätt att man går mer mot kapitalstruktur och mer diskuterar sådant?  
X: Absolut, det är klart. Det syns säkert redan i ett VD ord att, speglar läget, vad är det som 
händer och vad gör vi så att säga, utan tvekan. 
JÅ: Får man ta ett litet stickord som en sådan här grej som vi har pratat om här på 
avdelningen. För då är VD har ordet och sen har du egentligen den reglerade delen som är 
förvaltningsberättelsen och förvaltningsberättelse är egentligen samma sak, nu har jag 
förvaltat verksamheten under ett år. Förvaltningsberättelsen ligger ju närmare din del 
egentligen skulle man kunna säga, hur mycket sådan diskussion hade man där man jämförde 
lite grann, vad är det egentligen du tar upp nu i VD har ordet och vad skrivs i 
förvaltningsberättelsen? 
X: I grund och botten ska man känna igen sig, att det är samma företag man pratar om. Sen är 
förvaltningsberättelsen mer tillbakablickande och vd har ordet mer framåtblickande. Det har 
jag alltid tyckt att det är viktigt, att inte hålla på, ofta kunde det bli så att man haft utkast sen 
årsredovisningen eller även i slutprodukten att VD ordet skriver om en sak, sen har man de 
olika divisionerna till exempel, att en divisionschef skriver om precis samma sak utifrån sin 
horisont. Kanske inte i samma ordalydelse, sen kommer det i förvaltningsberättelse. Att 
samma grej står på många olika ställen, det kände jag alltid, det är fel, det ska vi inte göra, vi 
ska skriva om en sak en gång eller möjligtvis två, men att hålla på att upprepa samma ämne, 
det hör hemma någonstans men det är sällan vettigt att skriva på flera ställen. Det bidrar också 
till omfånget. Man måste känna igen sig hela vägen, det är viktigt. Man måste se det som en 
helhetsprodukt, sen produceras den på olika ställen men någon måste hålla ihop det och ha 
synpunkter på helheten.  
JÅ: För revisorerna läser väl förvaltningsberättelsen och går igenom den? 
X: Absolut, de kommenterar mest siffror, att siffror är korrekta och att man inte gör 
statements som är helt felaktiga. Men I grund och botten kollar revisorerna att siffrorna är rätt. 
JS: Vi märkte att många har inte en rubrik som heter förvaltningsberättelse, utan istället så har 
man det här som tidigare var den icke-reglerade delen utan istället så lägger de lite färg och så 
skriver de på introsidan , det här är förvaltningsberättelsen. Tror du att det handlar om att öka 
validiteten, nu är den här också granskad, all den här informationen. Att öka förtroendet för 
informationen. 





X: Så är väl, sen är det väl så att en årsredovisning som man publicerad är ju inte den man 
lämnar in hos den legala myndigheten, hos bolagsverket I Sverige, där måste det nog stå 
förvaltningsberättelse. Det är ju inte de glossy one utan det är vanligt papper, vanligt A4 
utskrivet rätt upp och ner utan bilder. 
JÅ: Om ni sitter där och funderar lite grann, lite grann om man återvänder till det där 
hållbarhets, det är ändå den stora trenden om man nu skulle ta de här senaste och jag förstår 
att det du refererar till här är beyond zero tänkandet. Nu är du ju inte kvar med de nya lagarna, 
men hur mycket inspirerades man av de olika modellerna som fanns, nu vet inte jag om ni, 
hakade ni på någon av de här tripple-bottom line eller skapade ni mer en egen modell hur ni 
ville hållbarhetsredovisa? 
X: Vi följde ju modeller som var etablerade av det enkla skälet att vi hade revision på de. Sen 
hur mycket som, kommer jag inte riktigt ihåg. Jag lade inte så mycket kraft på den delen om 
man säger så utan ville bara se att det hängde ihop med resten, men den producerades, den 
delen av årsredovisningen av andra människor. Men vi följde ju officiella modeller. 
JÅ: För det jag tänker lite på att det är en debatt som finns idag också, att skulle kunna ställa 
emot det finansiella. Det finansiella driver åt ett håll och hållbarhetsgrejerna driver åt ett annat 
håll och på något sätt kan dessa mötas på något sätt. Nästan så att man skulle kunna tänka sig 
att vi sänker vissa mål för att vi vill ta större ansvar, ok det får kosta lite mer, men kom man 
så långt i diskussioner hos er? 
X: Vi såg nog inte det så överhuvudtaget, det är klart att åtgärder för att förbättra 
verksamheten, investera i mer reningsanläggningar att det är klart att det kostar pengar men på 
något vis, men när man sätter upp mål för hur man ska minska utsläpp så allokerar man också 
vissa investeringar för det och tänker ungefär så här ser vi framför oss att det här kommer att 
kosta. Man kan säga att tar man på sig hatten , eller attityden att nu vill vi vara ett föredöme 
och driva en affär som är hållbar så har man inte så mycket val, sen kan man vara lite mer 
eller lite mindre men i princip så var det aldrig någon nisch, bortsätt från att vi , dels behöver 
vi göra det nu eller kan vi vänta något år till.  Den stora grejen hos oss i det sammanhanget 
var ju också att man samtidigt kunde visa hur våra produkter bidrar till en bättre värld, mindre 
energianvändning. Vi tog fram [product] som var mer energieffektiva än de som fanns 
tidigare till exempel. Många andra produkter som bevisligen kunde visa att de ger bättre 
effektivitet ur ett energihänseende än de som finns på marknaden idag, så blir det ju en 
affärspositiv aktivitet som bidrar, hela det där får man se tillsammans på något sätt. Vi såg det 
alltid som att det här är en affärsmöjlighet som vi måste driva på och så får man se till att man 
sköter sitt eget hus i linje med det. Det kostar någonting, men totalt sett är det en bra affär. 
Dessutom så är det väl så, det finns alltid vad man har för bakgrund eller sådär, men 
ansvarsfulla företag har i regel, vill i regel inte komma i en situation där man får problem med 
utsläppsfrågor eller annat, för det är inte bra för varumärket för det kan skada affärerna helt 
enkelt. 
JÅ: Jag passar på med en stickfråga till. Ni är ju ett extremt globalt företag, hur mycket 
hänsyn när det gäller styrning. Jag tänker nu när du pratar TVA-modellen som jag förstår 
också är global. Hur mycket hänsyn I övrigt har man tagit till att det ändå är ganska olika 
kulturer, det är lite det jag har stött på lite grann nu här I executive utbildningen för 
controllers, jätteskillnader, några från Sydamerika, några från Indien som gillar att lyda regler. 
Jag vet att när jag pratat med one att det ska vara på samma sätt, hur känner ni? 





X: Det är ändå one på något sätt, inte naturligtvis 100% eller fullt ut, kulturer och människor 
är olika. Det kan vara olika mellan Göteborg och Katrineholm beroende vilka människor som 
sitter på respektive ekonomichef på respektive ställe om vi nu pratar ekonomisidan, och det är 
klart att det ser annorlunda ut mellan länder men ändå så har jag aldrig tyckt att det varit ett 
stort problem. Är man på [Large cap company]  i Indien eller Malaysia eller USA eller vad 
som, det är så mycket som hänger ihop, det är så mycket som är gemensamt. Ekonomispråket 
blir väldigt gemensamt, sen att man gör på lite olika sätt har jag aldrig tyckt varit något större 
problem. Jag känner inte att vi hade svårigheter med det, men [Large cap company] var så 
oerhört globalt sen sedan så lång tid. Sedimenterad tanke i organisationen. Det var ingen som 
tyckte det var konstigt att en indier som jobbade i England eller i Sverige, eller att svenskar 
jobbar där, eller tyskar i Japan eller vad som helst. Det är väldigt naturligt, koncernspråket 
sedan 50-talet. Det sitter i generna ordentligt. Det märker man när man är ute på andra företag 
som inte är lika globalt etablerade. Bara det att man talar om moderbolag och dotterbolag till 
exempel, det fanns aldrig någon som pratade om dotterbolag på [Large cap company], det 
fanns inte det uttrycket ens, man såg på sina enheter. Det var jätteskillnad, att ha den 
etablerade globala kulturen och inte ha det. 
JÅ: Men upplever du att olika enheter, om man nu tänker sig TVA-modellen. Responderade 
man olika på den, upplevde du att det var mer driv på vissa ställen? 
X: Inte på grund av att det var något specifikt land eller så, utan det var väl i så fall olika 
människor. Men såg det aldrig som något problem. 
JÅ: Det är lite intressant, för det pratar man om ibland . Folk har olika drivkrafter, hur många 
mer sådana individuella incentivsystem eller ska man ha mer kollektiva, och det är mycket 
sådana diskussioner men du känner inte att det var? 
X: Inte på grund utav olika former av incentivesystem. Det kan man alltid diskutera om man 
ska ha TVA eller något annat men jag såg aldrig att det hade med kultur och land I grund och 
botten, utan det kan vara olika professionella uppfattningar så att säga. Nej inte på [Large cap 
company]. Det är en jätteskillnad att se de här företagen som har en globalt etablerad kultur 
och driver verksamheten utifrån det jämfört med de som sitter i Sverige och kör sina 
dotterbolag i där ute. 
JÅ: Om jag förstår dig rätt så hade ni en mycket större förståelse för agerandet i hela 
koncernen? 
X: Jag tror alla hade större förståelse, de som fanns i Indien var [Large cap company]are lika 
mycket som de var indier om man nu uttrycker det så, om man förenklar det lite grann. Om du 
tar ett annat företag som inte har den etablerade kulturen och sättet att jobba och tänka, så 
sitter man i Sverige så sätter man upp ett dotterbolag i Indien så skickar man dit en svensk så 
växer det lite grann. Det tar många år innan det där blir en naturlig del, ofta blir det de mot vi. 
Vi moderbolaget och dotterbolaget. Så fort jag hör när jag i styrelser när någon säger 
uttryckligen dotterbolag reagerar jag alltid. För det i sig själv är ett tecken att man inte tänkt 
igen på hur man vill driva sina affärer eller också har man, man har väl inte kommit så långt 
helt enkelt. 





JS: Jag tänker på den icke-reglerade, samma fråga som finansiella mål. Har styrelse mycket 
att säga till om där? 
X: Men nej, om jag minns rätt nu så var vår process i regel så här att årsredovisningen skriver 
styrelsen på, den formella delen, skriver under förvaltningsberättelsen tillslut. Den skickas ut 
ordentligt före styrelsemötet, presenteras och inte säker att alla läste den heller i och för sig, 
men de skrev i alla fall på. Sen så, den här andra delen kom ofta efteråt och så fick man alltså 
reagera som en styrelseledamot om man inte tyckte någonting var bra eller hade synpunkter, 
det förekom ju, men när man skriver på årsredovisningen åtminstone i [Large cap company] 
var det så, det är lite olika hur de här processerna ser ut I olika företag när man skriver på , då 
var ofta den delen kanske inte riktigt lika långt framme, så att den var ute på trycket så att 
säga. 
JS: Vad har du för synpunkter? Var det några vanliga? 
X: Nja, det kunde vara vad som helst, allt från någon som ville korrigera något enstaka ord, 
till språkliga saker, till är det här klokt att skriva på det här sättet, borde inte vinkla det så 
istället, så det varierar. 
JS: Tänkte också, IFRS vi diskuterade hur det har påverkat de finansiella målen, men har det 
påverkat den icke reglerade delen? 
X: Nej det tror jag inte, i så fall är det marginellt.  
JS: Då skulle jag säga att vi har ställt alla frågor, om du inte kommer på något mer. 
 7.2 Interview-guide 
1.) Vilka var de centrala val som gjordes när ni formulerade finansiella mål? Vilka är 
intressenterna?  
 
a.) Har styrelsen stor makt i denna process? 
 
b.) Beror friheten i formulerandet av finansiella mål mycket på vilken slags 
VD/Ordförande som är verksam? 
 
c.) Har det skett en maktförskjutning över tid till ägare istället för styrelsen? 
 
2.) Hur ser processen ut när ni väljer vad som skall presenteras i årsredovisningen? 
 
a.) Vad avgör om nyckeltal placeras i ”top ten” eller inte?  
 
b.) Har styrelsen stor makt i denna process? 
 
3.) På vilket sätt influerar konkurrenternas årsredovisningar er när ni utformar er egna 
rapport? D.v.s. hur influeras ni av trender? 
 





4.) Finns det någon slags uppföljning på hur ”bra” eller ”effektiv” tidigare 
årsredovisningar har varit, och i sådant fall, hur går den till? 
 
5.) Vad är det som avgör om information placeras i den reglerade eller icke-reglerade 
delen av årsredovisningen? 
 
6.) Hur ser processen ut när information väljs som skall presenteras i ”VD har ordet”.  
 
a.) 2007 valde ni att presentera samtliga finansiella mål i ”VD har ordet” medan ni 
2010 presenterade dem separat innan ”VD har ordet”. Varför valde ni att göra så? 
 
b.) 2010 presenteras först samtliga finansiella mål väldigt tydligt innan ”VD har 
ordet”, sedan presenteras samtliga igen i ”VD har ordet”. Hur såg processen ut när 
detta val gjordes? 
 
7.) Hur påverkade kravet på att följa IFRS utformandet av den icke-reglerade delen av 
årsredovisningen? 
 
8.) Hur påverkar turbulens, såsom t.ex. finanskrisen 2008, utformandet av 
årsredovisningen? 
